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ABSTRACT 
  
Comparative Cost Analysis of Alternative Animal Tracing Strategies Directed Toward 
Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreaks in the Texas High Plains.  
John Christopher Looney, B.S., University of Arkansas 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Bruce A. McCarl 
  
 The primary objective of this study is to evaluate the industry impact of a 
hypothetical Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in the Texas High Plains using 
alternative animal tracing levels. To accomplish this objective, an epidemiological 
disease spread model, AUSSPREAD, is used to simulate the FMD outbreak and an 
economic model is used to examine the impacts of different animal identification levels 
in cattle.  The different levels of animal identification relate to the model’s ability to 
trace back the subsequent infected and/or dangerous contacts with which the initial 
outbreak herd has been in contact.  The study examines direct disease management costs 
(slaughter, euthanasia, disposal, surveillance, and cleaning disinfection), forgone 
income, and other indirect costs (indemnity payments and welfare slaughter) for 
outbreaks originating from a large beef operation, a feedlot, and a saleyard across 
subsequent tracing periods from 1 to 10 days. Welfare slaughter and quarantine costs 
were estimated for the best and worst outbreaks from the feedlot operation. It is 
noteworthy that total direct costs of a FMD outbreak would be more extensive than the 
current study’s calculations, which only analyzed the direct disease management costs.  
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The increased days to trace dangerous contacts presented overall increases in 
outbreak losses over each outbreak scenario. Although outcome averages appear 
insensitive at times under the assumptions applied, the epidemiological model presented 
the possibility that traceability could reduce the risk of extreme outcomes in respect to 
the overall distribution of losses. For each cattle operation, the outbreaks stayed 
consistent or marginally increased with their respective average costs, but their 
maximum losses rose steadily, across the trace periods examined.  The impact of 
increased traceability and decreased outbreak length can be justified in affecting FMD 
outbreak costs in a positive manner. The results provide the industry with estimations of 
different outbreak scenarios which can be used to inform the decision on the NAIS 
system. Longer tracing periods, larger simulations (by iteration), and further study of the 
model is necessary in order to more accurately imitate FMD outbreaks within the Texas 
High Plains and its detrimental effects.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
I.1 Objective 
The primary objective of this study was to evaluate the industry impact of a 
hypothetical Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreak in the Texas High Plains with 
alternative animal tracing levels. To accomplish this objective, an epidemiological 
disease spread model (AUSSPREAD, Garner and Beckett, 2005) is used to simulate the 
FMD outbreak and an economic model (Elbakidze, 2008) to examine the impacts for 
different animal identification levels in cattle.  The different levels of animal 
identification relate to the model’s ability to trace back the subsequent infected and or 
dangerous contacts with which the initial outbreak herd has been in contact. By changing 
the tracing levels of these dangerous contacts, the model results indicate the benefits of 
added traceability of subsequent FMD infected herds in the context of the U.S. beef 
industry and agricultural industry. The costs of the added traceability will be represented 
and compared to a functional National Animal Identification System (NAIS). 
I.2 Motivation 
Currently, the U.S. has depended primarily on the word of the producers and 
livestock owners to find all other animals possibly infected with an animal disease. 
___________ 
This thesis follows the style of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
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Some paper trail exists with health papers, transfer documents, and bills of sale to help 
with animal searches, but there can still be gaps of information which can allow for 
missed animals and further spread of the animal disease. Animal identification and 
tracking will allow the most effective way to find all the subsequent infected animals or 
herds quickly in the event of an outbreak in order to minimize the impact of the disease. 
Tracking animal movements will also help in finding potentially infected herds that 
would be otherwise missed, overlooked, or “forgotten” about.   The countries that have 
had animal disease outbreaks in the past have suffered staggering economic losses which 
have in turn crippled the associated industries and producers for an extended period of 
time, if not, forever. The problem of potential disease outbreaks is a serious concern for 
any country, especially for those who have nothing in place to restrain the disease from 
becoming endemic. 
 Whether the animal identification system for the United States is the NAIS or 
something else, it is important to prepare response plans for diseases such as FMD. The 
objective of such a plan would be to quickly isolate the disease before it becomes 
uncontrollable. If a highly infectious animal disease such as FMD was introduced in the 
U.S. without a response system such as NAIS, animal health officials would be unable to 
locate many of the potential infected premises. Epidemiologists could spend days 
interviewing herd owners, veterinarians, county agents, and others to gather names and 
addresses of potential producers in the area. This process alone may take several days, 
weeks, or possibly months to complete depending on existing resources. As each day 
passes, the disease would spread further, and more animals or herds would be exposed. 
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As the number of exposed animals increased, more producers would be directly 
impacted by the outbreak. The cost of mitigation efforts could increase by hundreds of 
thousands of dollars per day and the producer’s loss of livestock and their own 
livelihoods would grow exponentially as each day passes (USDA, 2007).  If the same 
scenario occurred in the U.S. with a functional and effective NAIS, animal health 
officials could use the system’s databases on day one of the response to identify all the 
potentially infected premises and exposed animals in the surrounding area. During the 
same day, epidemiologists would be able to contact the owners of the premises and 
begin taking steps to prevent the outbreak from spreading further. Also, combined 
efforts of private and state animal tracking databases would provide information on 
animals that have moved from infected zones (USDA, 2007). NAIS’ ability to trace 
infected and potentially infected animals would allow the U.S. to rapidly respond to a 
foreign animal disease outbreak and neutralize its spreading quickly and efficiently. The 
identification system’s capabilities present how important animal traceability can be in 
the event of an outbreak.  
The focus of this study will be the benefits of minimizing economic losses from a 
disease outbreak. By quantifying the potential costs of a hypothetical FMD outbreak in 
one area, we will be able to estimate how much of an impact the disease might have on 
the national industry as a whole. The research should show that rapid disease response 
will reduce the detrimental costs of a FMD outbreak or any other animal disease 
epidemic. Decreasing the amount of time it takes to find any animal that has had contact 
with the initial infected herd will help in the reduction of the economic strain of the 
4 
 
 
disease, whether it is for the producers or the industry. The results should illustrate the 
significance of having such a program in place and why the NAIS could be successful if 
the majority of producers participated. With less producers affected by the disease, fewer 
hardships would occur, such as losing irreplaceable breeding stock and bloodlines, as 
well as animal distress and losses incurred by the eradication efforts. An animal 
identification system will also aid in reducing the economic strain that a disease could 
cause including the loss of jobs or decreased incomes for families and individuals, the 
loss of animals, and the loss towards the livelihoods in affected communities. 
With an implementation of an animal tracking system, producers will be able 
prove that their animals were not affected by an outbreak and can avoid unnecessary 
slaughter of their animals. This can be done with the system’s ability to quickly define 
which regions of the country are and are not affected by an animal disease. It may be 
true that borders, at least initially, will close if an outbreak was found. Yet, if a system 
was able to quickly identify all animals that could possibility be infected, perhaps fewer 
markets and trade borders would close and the time it would take to reopen those 
markets would be quicker. A tracking system, such as the NAIS, will also improve the 
marketability of U.S. products and can help maintain and protect prices for domestic 
commodities in order to keep international markets open. The research done in this study 
hopes to demonstrate through simulated disease outbreaks and control strategies that the 
economic losses minimized by having animal tracing would prevent the vast financial 
losses that could incur without having such response capabilities. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
BACKGROUND ON FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE AND ANIMAL 
TRACEABILITY 
II.1 Foot and Mouth Disease 
Foot and Mouth Disease, more correctly referred to as Hoof and Mouth Disease, 
is a highly contagious viral disease affecting cloven hoof species, including cattle, swine, 
sheep, and goats. Signs of the disease include blisters followed by erosions in the mouth 
or on the feet. The resulting excessive salivation and/or lameness are the best known 
signs of the disease. It can leave the animal debilitated and cause serious losses in milk 
and meat yields. FMD does not affect humans. 
The last outbreak of FMD in the U.S. was in 1929. However, it is still considered 
the most dangerous foreign animal disease that could be introduced into the country.  
The estimated costs of disease outbreaks have been large in other countries.  For 
example, the cost of the FMD outbreak in Taiwan in 1997 was $1.6 billion; and in 2001, 
a research study estimated the potential economic impact of a hypothetical outbreak in 
Australia to be $1.5 to $10 billion (Ward et al., 2007). Recent outbreaks in countries 
such as Japan, South Korea, France, the Netherlands, and the U.K. have shown the 
importance of a well planned response strategy.  
The U.K. has experienced FMD outbreaks in 2001 and in 2007. By the time the 
first case of FMD had been confirmed in 2001, close to 60 premises were already 
infected. More than seven months later (221 days), when the outbreak was eradicated, 
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“2,026 cases of FMD had been confirmed, approximately 6.5 million animals were 
destroyed, and the disease had spread to Ireland, France, and the Netherlands” (Pendell, 
2008). It took another four months for the U.K. to regain “FMD free” status by the 
Organization of International Epizootics (OIE). The most recent outbreak (August 2008) 
was declared eradicated in September 2008. Although serious, the outbreak was less 
severe than the 2001 outbreak,” …because there were systems in place” (Pendell, 2008). 
As a current protection policy, countries with endemic FMD are not allowed to 
export products that may transfer the disease.  The USDA strategy to protect the U.S. 
from the risk of FMD includes monitoring the occurrence of FMD outside the country, 
regulating, inspecting, and intercepting products at the U.S. borders, maintaining a 
strong animal health infrastructure inside the U.S., and finally, establishing and 
maintaining a strong emergency response system to quickly control and/or eradicate the 
disease (NCBA, 2008). One way the USDA has improved its response system is through 
the National Animal identification System (NAIS). 
Increased animal traceability will aid in combating the spread of contagious 
diseases such as FMD by determining where an animal has been in order to isolate, 
trace, and prevent the spread of the disease. Although the U.S. is developing an animal 
traceability system, it is still behind many other countries in doing so. There were efforts 
to develop and implement animal tracing systems in the U.S. prior to the discovery of 
one cow that tested positive for BSE in the state of Washington in 2003. Those efforts 
gained substantial momentum in subsequent years (Pendell, 2008). 
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II.2 Animal Traceability  
The current status of the National Animal Identification System (NAIS) is not 
where it was projected to be by Mike Johanns, the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, in 
2005. The strategic plan for the system proposed that all premises be registered and all 
animals be identified in accordance to NAIS standards by January 2008. These 
developments clearly did not occur within that time frame, with premise registration and 
animal identification still in its infancy. The National Animal Identification System’s 
current participation is voluntary.  
The three parts or steps for participating in the NAIS are as follows. (USDA, 
2008) First, each registered livestock premise is given a Premise Identification Number 
(PIN). Second, all food animals are to be identified either with a group/lot identification 
number (GIN) or an animal identification number (AIN). Participation in animal 
identification is not required but if an owner decides to participate with animal ID, then 
there are specific manufacturers that produce AIN devices including visual tags, RFID 
tags, and injectable transponders. The last step for NAIS is animal tracing. Animal 
tracking databases (ATD) that are maintained by the states and private industry can be 
selected by producers. There are several ATDs collecting animal movements that can be 
found online. ATDs are beneficial for animal tracing because they can provide timely, 
accurate records, which will show where your animals have been and what other animals 
have come into contact with them (USDA, 2008). 
The NAIS is supposed to help producers and animal health officials respond 
quickly and effectively to animal disease events in the United States. If a disease 
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outbreak were to occur, rapid tracking and detection of associated animals through a 
system, such as the NAIS, would minimize the detrimental effects and costs of the 
disease on the producers as well as the industry as a whole. The long term goal of NAIS 
is to provide animal health officials with the capability to identify all livestock and 
premises that have had direct contact with a reportable disease of concern within 48 
hours after discovery of the disease (USDA, 2007). 
The NAIS program was initially introduced as a mandatory program, which met 
a good deal of resistance from some producers and industry groups. Now, as a voluntary 
program, this may be one of the biggest stumbling blocks it has towards getting to the 
necessary level of participation needed to become useful in preventing large-scale 
disease outbreaks. As of now, participation and premise registration has been erratic at 
best. The USDA currently estimates that almost 33% of the nation’s 1.4 million 
livestock farms have been registered (Foster, 2008). The most successful areas of the 
country with participation in the NAIS are those states that have made it mandatory. 
Wisconsin has led the way by making the system mandatory through a state statue in 
2006.  Michigan’s Department of Agriculture made a mandatory requirement in 
November 2006, which required all animals that are moved off the farm premises to 
have electronic identification (Foster, 2008). To further push its development, the USDA 
has purchased a total of 1.5 million “840” radio frequency animal identification tags to 
support the disease control programs (Foster, 2008). Beyond animal identification, the 
third component of the NAIS, establishing a cohesive system to track animal 
movements, seems to pose the biggest challenge for the program. From recent reports, 
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USDA officials have noted that there is still a great deal of infrastructure left to complete 
in order to coordinate this final aspect of the NAIS (Foster, 2008). It seems as long as the 
process is voluntary for the NAIS, it will be a long time before the system is functional 
and can make a significant impact in controlling disease outbreaks. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 “The efficient and rapid tracking of physical product and traits from and to 
critical points of origin or destination in the food chain necessary to achieve specific 
food safety and or assurance goals” is the definition of traceability in American 
Agriculture according to Farm Foundation (2004). There have been many studies and 
publications on animal identification and the related benefits and costs of animal 
traceability. Although the research area of NAIS is deep, there have not been many 
studies involving animal identification and its impact on the industry. However, studies 
on the epidemiology of diseases, such as FMD and BSE are many and provide a means 
to support the rationale for studies on animal identification. There have been many 
investigations of a possible Foot and Mouth disease outbreak in the U.S. and its 
consequences.  
Different control options for FMD were examined for their effectiveness (Garner 
and Lack, 1995). Their study focused on three regions in Australia: i) Northern New 
South Wales; ii) Northern Victoria; and iii) the Midlands region of Western Australia.  
The different control responses included: slaughter of infected animals only, slaughter of 
infected and potentially infected animals, slaughter of infected animals with 
implementing early ring vaccination, and finally slaughter of infected animals plus late 
vaccination. Garner and Lack used a stochastic epidemiological model that included 
using Monte-Carlo methods. Their input-output analysis estimated that if the FMD 
11 
 
 
outbreak was likely to spread quickly then the best way to reduce the economic impact 
of the outbreak was to slaughter all the infected animals as well as all the potentially 
infected animals. The research also concluded that “zoning” had potential to lessen the 
detrimental effects of an outbreak.  Finally, early ring vaccination was not economically 
justifiable when compared to stamping out even though it did reduce the size and 
duration of the outbreaks (Garner and Lack, 1995). 
Ekboir (1999) performed a similar study with a hypothetical FMD outbreak 
which showed the potential losses in California’s South Valley (Fresno, Kerns, Kings, 
and Tulane counties) could amount to an estimated $13.5 billion. A state-transition 
model developed from a Markov chain similar to Garner and Lack (1995) was used to 
carry out the research. Five health states were installed in the model including 
susceptible, latent, infected, immune, and depopulated. The economic model connected 
to the disease spread model was comprised of three sections. The first dealt with the 
direct costs of depopulation, disinfection, and enforcing the quarantine zone. The second 
of the economic model used an input-output model to calculate the direct, indirect, and 
induced losses for California. The final part computed the losses from restricted trade. 
Ekboir’s study evaluated different mitigation strategies including: i) partial stamping out 
with and without ring vaccination; ii) complete stamping out with ring vaccination; and 
iii) vaccination only. The results concluded that the control strategies involving 
vaccination were more expensive compared to the non-vaccination strategies since 
export markets were lost and control costs increased (Ekboir, 1999). 
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A study done at the University of Tennessee projected economic impacts of a 
FMD outbreak inside the state. The study estimated the economic effects of the FMD 
outbreak by examining depopulation rate scenarios of 50%, 35%, and 10%. They used 
TN-AIM (an IMPLAN-based input-output model for the Tennessee economy) to 
decrease the industry output for the sectors of dairy farm products, ranch fed cattle, 
range fed cattle, and hogs to simulate the depopulation rate scenarios. The model 
estimated the industry output losses, disposal costs, labor costs to enforce quarantine 
zones, tourism losses, and etc. The results of the study presented estimated direct effects 
of 136 million in losses to industry output and over 6,000 jobs lost for the 10% outbreak. 
The 50% outbreak resulted in 357 million in direct losses to the industry and when 
considering all other effects, amounted to over 690 million in total losses. The 50% 
outbreak also estimated that over 25,000 jobs would be lost through the outbreaks’ 
impact. They also predicted a 10% percent decrease in tourism in the state of Tennessee. 
It is clear the effects multiplied as the outbreaks got larger. These results influenced the 
current study of how to minimize the outbreak length in order to minimize its total 
effects (Jensen et al., 2003). 
Another state study for potential impact of FMD was analyzed by Ekboir, Jarvis, 
and Bervejillo (2003) for California. They again used an epidemiological model which 
was a state transition model developed from a Markov chain. They estimated direct costs 
of the outbreak, production losses, indirect and induced losses, and finally trade losses 
from the entire U.S. They considered seven scenarios with high and low dissemination 
rates, and altered the percent of depopulation per week, as well as the particular week 
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when eradication was initiated. The analysis “…indicated that the time that is required to 
diagnose FMD and initiate the stamping out policy was the most important factor in 
determining the outbreaks ultimate effect” (Ekboir, 2001).  The simulation results 
defended that the effectiveness of the eradication process depended on when it was 
started. A week delay in initiating “depopulation increased the proportion of infected 
premises from 18% to 90%” (Ekboir, 2001). The results also found it profitable for 
California to invest in supplementary resources to watch for, and respond to, an FMD 
outbreak. If the resources could minimize the outbreak by 5 billion, the research found 
that California could spend up to $700,000 a year in preventative methods for a FMD 
outbreak (Ekboir, 2001). 
Schoenbaum and Disney (2003) also looked at the effectiveness of slaughter and 
vaccination strategies under different conditions of herd sizes and disease spread rates in 
the U.S.  Three different geographically circular regions that contained different 
livestock populations were considered: South Central U.S., North-Central U.S., and 
Western U.S. The varying options for slaughter were: slaughter only infected herds, 
slaughter herds with direct contact with the initial herd within two weeks prior to the 
first detection of the outbreak, slaughter herds within three kilometers distance of the 
initial infected herd, and slaughter herds with both indirect and direct contact with the 
initial infected herd. Vaccination strategies included no vaccination, vaccinating all 
herds within 10 km of the infected herds after 2 detections were made, and then 
vaccinating all herds within 10 km of the initial infected herds after 50 infected animals 
were detected. The materials included a stochastic simulation model for FMD which was 
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based on previous designed state transition model by Garner and Lack (1995). They 
installed direct, indirect, and airborne spread mechanisms and evaluated both direct (by 
animal) and indirect (by people) movements to quantify the spread rate. They chose 14 
days as the time it took to trace direct and indirect herds. Detection of the disease was 
determined by two probability charts and all infected herds were found by day 25 or 
sooner. Median governmental costs for the outbreaks ranged from $300,000 to $2.8 
billion depending on the scenario. The study also found that changes in consumer and 
producer surpluses could amount to an annual $789.9 million dollar loss (Schoenbaum 
and Disney, 2003). The best mitigation tactic depended on herd demographics and on the 
contact rate between the herds. The most expensive slaughter strategy was ring slaughter 
while slaughtering infected (direct contacts) and dangerous (indirect contacts) herds 
decreased the control costs of FMD compared to only slaughtering infected herds.  Also, 
ring vaccination was more costly than slaughter strategies, but early vaccination was an 
effective strategy to shorten the FMD outbreaks (Schoenbaum and Disney, 2003). 
Bates, Carpenter, and Thurmond (2003b) performed a benefit-cost analysis of 
vaccination and preemptive slaughter as a means to eradicate FMD where the sample 
population examined was 2,238 herds and 5 saleyards located in Fresno, Kings, and 
Tulane counties of California. They used a spatial stochastic epidemic simulation model 
and applied direct costs associated with indemnity, slaughter, disinfection, and 
vaccination for different eradication strategies. They also estimated additional cost, total 
program cost, net benefit, and benefit costs for each strategy. Four alternate control 
strategies were simulated: i) slaughter all infected herds and quarantining FMD infected 
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areas; ii) ring vaccinate all uninfected herds within 1 to 5 km of infected herds; iii) 
slaughtering all herds within 1 to 5 km of infected herds; and iv) slaughter the “highest 
risk” herds.  Mean vaccination costs were calculated to be $2,960/herd, and total 
eradication costs ranged from $61 million to $551 million (Bates et al., 2003b). They 
found that “all of their supplemental strategies involving use of vaccination were 
economically efficient and feasible; whereas, supplemental strategies involving 
preemptive slaughter were not found to be economically efficient or feasible” (Bates et 
al., 2003b). This study concluded that vaccination with an efficacious vaccine may be 
cost effective for control of FMD, but only if vaccinated animals were not afterward 
slaughtered and if there were no negative economic impacts such as closing of export 
markets and trade restrictions. The study did however find that the current U.S. 
eradication policy was preferred over other selective preemptive slaughter strategies 
(Bates et al., 2003b).  Bates found that vaccines could be useful, but the current US 
stockpile of FMD vaccines and labor needed to perform such vaccination tasks may be 
unreasonable. Also, it is likely that trade restrictions would occur regardless of whether 
vaccination was used or not.  
One study, in southwest Kansas, described the consequences of an FMD 
outbreak stemming from a single cow-calf operation, a single medium size feedlot, and 
simultaneous introduction at five large feedlots. The regional economic impact study 
used an epidemiological model for FMD and the results obtained indicated that as the 
size of the index herd infected with FMD increased, the outbreak duration, number of 
animals destroyed, and associated costs would also increase. The input-output analysis 
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indicated the losses from the FMD outbreaks originating in a cow calf operation, 
medium size feedlot, and 5 large feedlots were estimated to be $32 million, $193 
million, and $942 million respectively. The overall impact for Kansas for the same 
scenarios were estimated to be total losses of $51 million, $284 million, and $1.3 billion, 
respectively (Pendell and Schroeder, 2007).  
In an investigation that also used the High Plains data, Elbakidze (2008) used the 
Reed Frost model along with an economic modeling framework to study the 
effectiveness of several strategies to control FMD under 4 different scenarios of disease 
introduction into the High Plains of Texas. The model was used to simulate the disease 
outbreak and the different control responses. The economic part presented the costs of 
the disease outbreak for the livestock industry in terms of lost animal values and lost 
gross revenue due to the epidemic. The costs incurred also included disease management 
costs such as euthanasia, disposal, disinfection, vaccination, and surveillance.  The 
results found that of the scenarios that were under investigation, the most effective ones 
for reducing the economic losses of a FMD outbreak in the High Plains were to have 
detection as early as possible. In some of the scenarios, enhanced surveillance provided a 
benefit but not always, and the ability to have more vaccine available seemed to increase 
the costs instead of reduce the overall cost of the outbreak. The simulations suggested 
that an FMD outbreak could cost up to $1 billion in the High Plains industry losses 
alone. Based on other assumptions and the results of the epidemiologic disease spread 
simulations, the analysis indicated that early detection was the most economically 
effective control option of those considered in the study. The results found that early 
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detection reduced the median epidemic costs by approximately $150 million (68%), $40 
million (69%), $5 million (74%), and 3 million (97%) for Large Feedlot, Backgrounder 
Feedlot, Large Grazing, and Backyard introductions, respectively (Elbakidze, 2008). 
Even though there have not been many studies with animal identification, more 
are being published with the fear that animal disease outbreaks could increase. Various 
analyses consider the benefits and costs associated with animal identification in cattle.  
The current U.S. response strategy mainly relies on quarantine and depopulation 
of infected herds, identified based on “sound epidemiological evidence” and largely 
relying on the recognition of clinical signs by a producer, an animal caretaker, a meat 
inspector, or a veterinarian to detect animal diseases such as FMD (Bates et al., 2003a). 
The problem with this approach is that detection is solely based on visual observation 
which can be problematic, especially when the clinical signs of one disease may be 
similar to other diseases.  
Some studies have dealt with animal diseases and traceability (Pendell, 2006, 
2008; Pendell and Schroeder, 2007; Pendell et al., 2007), particularly, the effect of 
traceability success rates and the subsequent impact it would have on a hypothetical 
FMD outbreak. The authors used a simulated outbreak in southwest Kansas, and used 
the North American Animal Disease Spread Model (NAADSM) for the epidemiological 
model. The model was designed by APHIS and has also been used by Disney et al. 
(2001) and Schoenbaum and Disney (2003). The model was based on previous work 
done by Garner and Lack (1995), and with stochastic simulation and temporal and 
spatial spread of the FMD virus at the herd level (Pendell, 2006). The model allowed for 
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5 different health/disease states: latently infected, susceptible, infectious and sub-
clinically infected, infectious and clinically infected, and immune (Pendell and 
Schroeder, 2007). Pendell evaluated outbreaks initiated from three different premises: 
feedlot, farm, and swine operation, and estimated appraisal, cleaning and disinfection, 
euthanizing, indemnity payments, and disposal costs for each outbreak (Pendell, 2006). 
Animal traceability was added by changing the success rate of finding the direct 
and indirect trace back animals that may be infected with FMD. Pendell used tracing 
levels of 90% (high), 60% (medium), and 30% (low) in order to determine the impact 
that animal tracing can have after an outbreak is found.  The model (NAADSM) 
contained limitations that restricted any other changes in animal tracing. The model also 
assumed all disease spread and trace backs occurred within 24 hours of first detection. 
The model confined itself to minimize tracing forward only one level, which prevents 
itself from finding herds beyond one level and does not find the potential infected herds 
that infected the detected premise (Pendell, 2006). Although the animal tracing was 
conservative, the results depicted increasing mean, minimum, and maximum 
depopulation, and costs across the decreasing traceability success rates. The average cost 
expenditures for a feedlot outbreak expanded from $196 million (high level) to $402 
million (medium level) to 560 million (low level). The maximum cost expenditures for 
the feedlot outbreak ranged from 742 million (high) to 1,231 million (medium) to 1,435 
million (low). The farm operation outbreaks costs ranged from 1.7 million (high) to near 
11 million (low), and for the maximum costs, ranged from only 5.4 million (high) to 23 
million (low) (Pendell, 2006). Pendell concluded that as the extent of animal 
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identification in cattle increased, the number of animals culled was reduced as were the 
associated costs, and the length of the outbreak (by nearly two weeks). As the 
surveillance was increased, costs of consumer/producer welfare decreased. Producer and 
consumer surplus figures decreased approximately 60% (Pendell, 2006). 
Another study used similar animal tracing levels and the epidemiological disease 
spread model to simulate a hypothetical FMD outbreak in southwest Kansas (Pendell, 
2008). The study also involved simulating the outbreak with three different levels of 
animal identification, referred to as high, medium, and low. The high level system had a 
90% success rate of both direct and indirect trace back within 24 hours. The medium and 
low level systems had 60% and 30% success rates, respectively. The study found that the 
total number of infected livestock and the length of the epidemic were among the factors 
that most affect economic impact (Pendell, 2008). The loss of animals in this study 
ranged from 790,000 head for the low level ID system to 265,000 for the high level ID 
system. The producer losses for the meat industry (i.e. beef, pork, and poultry) were also 
calculated and ranged from $535 million for the low level system to $399 million for the 
high level ID system. The study also presented the importance of animal tracing and 
trace-back, and showed the difference success rates that trace back sensitivity could have 
on a model of disease spread. Regardless of differences, the study suggested that as 
animal tracing intensifies, the number of livestock lost to a FMD outbreak will decrease 
along with the FMD related costs (Pendell, 2008). 
Elbakidze (2007) also evaluated the effect of an animal identification system on 
traceability and subsequent isolation of potentially infected herds. He found two main 
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drawbacks of the NAIS. First, producers do not want any additional costs to their 
program to implement and operate an animal tracking system. Second, producers are 
concerned about potential liability that could arise due to the information available 
through the NAIS. In addition, some producers may be uncomfortable with the 
possibility of NAIS data becoming available to the Internal Revenue Service. Elbakidze 
also investigated the benefits of the NAIS, especially in minimizing expected losses to 
cattle producers, including the costs of lost production, suppressed demand in the cattle 
industry, lost export markets, indirect losses in related industries, and the costs of 
preventing and responding to an outbreak. The model was used to conduct sensitivity 
analyses of the benefits of investing in an animal tracking system. The results showed 
that if the tracking process was efficient, then contact rates decreased, and the number of 
cattle lost also decreased. For instance, reducing the tracking time from four days to two 
days generated enough benefits to exceed the costs of an infectious disease outbreak 
(Elbakidze, 2007). 
The costs of implementing an animal tacking system such as the NAIS continue 
to be one of the biggest obstacles for producers to participate in the system. Before 2003, 
full implementation costs of the U.S. Animal Identification Plan were estimated to total 
over $500 million for the first six years of the program (Bailey, 2004). Another cost 
study completed by Sparks Companies Inc. (2002) estimated that the capital investment 
required to implement a source verification system for cattle would only be approx-
imately $140 million with an additional annual variable cost of about $108 million.  
Buhr (2002) estimated the costs of implementing a farm to fork traceability system for a 
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single supply chain in Europe to be between $10-12 million. Costs were also calculated 
by Blasi et al. (2003) for the NAIS for Texas Producers. The latter study estimated the 
annual costs of implementing the animal ID system at the producer level for cow/calf 
operators and feedlots. Their calculations included the costs of transponder tags, 
electronic readers, computer hardware, computer software, internet access, required 
upgrades, and labor. These estimations were combined with Texas cattle inventory 
numbers to derive an approximation of the NAIS costs based on Texas cattle herd 
composition according to size and type of operation. The annual NAIS costs according 
to Blasi’s estimations were $112 million dollars a year (Blasi et al., 2003).  
The main issues with animal identification, according to Bailey and Slade (2004), 
relate to how the liability will be shared in a system such as the NAIS and how the costs 
of implementing animal ID will be allocated. One question is which technology or 
technologies will be used and how those technologies will interface in transferring 
information to a national database. But despite these problems, animal ID and the NAIS 
“offers opportunities for controlling animal diseases, standardizing beef trade in world 
markets, and expanding niche market opportunities to beef producers” (Bailey, 2004). 
The most important reason to implement NAIS among the supporters and non supporters 
of animal identification is the maintenance of our international markets; both parties 
agree on this issue (Bailey and Slade, 2004). 
Maintaining open trade markets has become significant because the value of U.S. 
cattle exports reached about $200 million in live animals and over $3 billion in animal 
products in 2000 (Disney et al., 2001). However, since the discovery of BSE infected 
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cattle in 2003, the 2007 value of the U.S. beef industry has declined to 74 billion dollars, 
and the number of cattle slaughtered per year is approximately 34 million. The 2007 
value of U.S beef exports was $2.175 billion dollars, up from 631 million in 2004. Beef 
exports peaked in 2003, with a value near 3.2 billion dollars. Although most export 
markets have reopened and recovered, 2007 numbers for U.S. meat and livestock 
import/export values were near $900 million, and a decline of about $600 million in 
Japan and South Korea since 2003. These differences clearly show the importance of 
maintaining our foreign markets and how imperative it is to keep our animals healthy 
and accounted for. Although traceability systems will not prevent markets from closing, 
they do minimize the time that markets are shut down. These export values can also be 
used as additional potential losses in the current study if we assume that markets will 
close after a FMD outbreak is announced (USDA, 2009b). 
A benefit and cost analysis of animal identification for disease control was 
examined by the Center for Animal Disease and Information and the Center for 
Epidemiology and Animal Health. The reports clearly stated the benefits of an 
identification system are “limiting the spread of a foreign animal disease (FAD), 
enabling faster traceback of infected animals, limiting production losses due to disease 
presence, reducing the cost of governmental control, intervention, and eradication, and 
ultimately minimizing potential trade losses” (Disney et al., 2001). Other potential 
benefits included:  reducing the economic consequences of endemic animal diseases that 
are already under eradication, promoting consumer confidence in the national livestock 
industry, and contributing to producer gains from improved genetics, carcass quality, 
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herd certification, and premium prices for specific products. The research estimated 
benefit cost ratios stochastically to show the uncertainty and variability involved with 
disease outbreaks. The benefits were based on the assumption that a single primary 
disease outbreak would occur in the U.S. over a 50 year time frame. Professional surveys 
were used to estimate the level of identification present, the time required to trace, and 
the probability of correctly identifying the index case. These were coupled with different 
scenarios of tracking cattle and swine from one location to another using only paper trail 
tracking first; and then improved tracking using back tags and ear tags plus the paper 
trail. The analysis suggested that for cattle, the enhanced level of identifications could 
provide sufficient economic benefits in terms of reduced FAD consequences, but for the 
swine scenarios, the improved systems did not show significant benefits. They 
concluded that when effective, recording systems could make possible rapid disease 
control and disposal (Disney et al., 2001). 
Disney et al. (2001) also presented cost figures that were useful in this current 
study. Their premise was that if an identification and tracking system was in place, the 
labor and costs to run the system should be considered. They assumed each data entry of 
livestock movement cost $ US 0.10, considering a clerk earning approximately $20,000 
per year. They also assumed that a maximum of 11 data entry actions per animal could 
occur, so the maximum data entry costs of an animal would be $1.10. With these figures, 
the research involving cattle estimated that there would be a $48 million dollar 
difference between a paper trail system compared to a system using back and ear tags. 
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The back and ear tag system was found to cost $72 and $84 million dollars respectively 
to track cattle to the former places of ownership (Disney et al., 2001). 
In April, 2009, The USDA and APHIS made available a benefit cost analysis of 
the National Animal Identification System. APHIS along with numerous universities 
(led by Kansas State University) conducted the study. The analysis showed that not 
implementing some aspects of NAIS could result in considerable losses, as much as 
$1.32 billion on average per year over a 10 year period, due mostly to restricted export 
trading. The cattle industry costs for the NAIS were 91.5% percent of the total costs for 
the major food animal species (sheep, swine, poultry, and cattle). Most (75%) of the 
cattle sectors yearly implementation cost consisted of identification tags and the act of 
tagging the animals. The tagging costs varied across producers. Tagging costs included 
the labor, chute, tag applicator, and economic impact of cattle shrink and potential injury 
for cattle and people during tagging. The cost per cow ranged from a low $2.53 per 
animal for the largest operation, to a high of $5.84 per head for the smallest operation. 
The RFID tags represented about 46% of the total costs to the industry (USDA, 2009a). 
The overall costs for 90% participation level NAIS, the minimal level deemed 
effective by APHIS would be $192.22 million dollars annually for all four primary 
animal species (cattle, swine, sheep, and poultry). A 100% participation level for all 
species would cost about $228.27 million annually. The cattle sector (beef and dairy) 
would account for 92% of those costs. For 90% and 100% participation levels, a 
traceable NAIS system would cost $175.87 and $209.07 million annually. Some of the 
average costs within the beef sector included $4.91 per head for beef cattle operation, 
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$.71 per head for backgrounder operation, $.51 per head for a feedlot, $.23 for an 
auction market, and $.10 per head for packers. The average cost per animal marketed 
throughout the cattle sector would be $5.97, with dairy cows averaging the highest at 
$6.21. The benefits consisted of reducing animal disease testing times and the associated 
costs “aid” to ensure that markets maintain at the current levels or better, and the ability 
of NAIS animal identification methods to be used in other value added and certification 
programs. The general benefits discussed included better disease management and 
surveillance, reduction of economic impact of animal disease events, and the ability of 
NAIS to prove U.S. origin for other programs, such as COOL (country of origin 
labeling) (USDA, 2009a). 
These costs of the NAIS will be compared to the FMD outbreak results to 
determine if a “complete” traceback system would benefit the producers and the U.S. 
agricultural industry.  
Other research that directly relates to this study includes the work done by 
Beckett and Garner, the creators of the original model used in this study, AUSSPREAD. 
The Australian Government Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
developed AUSSPREAD, a sophisticated spatial model for FMD. The outputs include “a 
range of maps and tabulated outbreak statistics describing the outbreak, and its duration, 
the numbers of affected, slaughtered and as relevant, vaccinated herds or flocks, and the 
cost of control and eradication” (Garner and Beckett, 2005). AUSSPREAD is written in 
MapBasic (MapInfo Corporation, Troy, NY, USA) and simulates the spread of FMD in 
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daily time steps in order to allow farm interaction between different animal species and 
different production types.  
Tracing will be the control measure that will be altered in this study. 
AUSSPREAD uses probabilities to find farms with which the infected farm has had 
direct or indirect contact (“Trace forward”) and the source of infection (“trace back”). 
Traced farms that are considered to have had a high chance of exposure to FMD are 
specified as dangerous contacts (dc) and are subject to active surveillance (Garner and 
Beckett, 2005). Sensitivity within the tracing procedure is defined as the proportion of 
source or contacted farms that will be correctly identified as infected herds. Specificity 
allows the model to simulate farms that have been incorrectly found as infected 
premises. The default farm types used will be beef cattle, dairy cattle, sheep, pigs, small 
holders and feedlots. These will be added to and diversified for our study in the Texas 
High Plains. AUSSPREAD will also allow variables such as the rate of disease spread 
through the population, the time period from infection until the initial detection of 
disease, and the ability and extent of resources for performing mitigations (Garner and 
Beckett, 2005). 
Welfare slaughter is a relatively new concept in foreign animal disease (FAD) 
eradication. A short welfare slaughter study is planned in the current study to see its 
added effect on the costs of an FMD outbreak. The welfare slaughter refers to the 
slaughter of animals that are not known to be infected by the FAD but have to be 
eliminated because of overcrowding or other deteriorating animal husbandry conditions 
on farms placed under movement restrictions; for example, when animals are in excess 
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of market demands, when proper management can no longer be assured, or both 
(Whiting, 2003). With Welfare slaughter, animals are destroyed and do not enter the 
food chain as is also seen with pre-emptive slaughter and stamping out (Miranda, 1999). 
The meat from the animal carcasses under movement restriction cannot be salvaged for 
human food under EC regulations; therefore, it is usually sent to rendering or otherwise 
destroyed. One lesson to be learned from the experience of recent disease eradication 
efforts is that the number of welfare slaughter animals rises rapidly during the course of 
an expanding animal disease. In recent incursions of FAD into member countries of the 
Office International des Epizootics (OIE) whose national policy is stamping out, the 
scale of welfare slaughter was such that its cost was one half to 10 times that of 
eradicating the disease on infected farms (Whiting, 2003). Welfare slaughter is a direct 
cost of FAD eradication and often far exceeds the cost of dealing with infected farms. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND PROCEDURE 
IV.1 Model 
This project will expand on work previously done with the model AUSSPREAD. 
The simulation will involve FMD outbreaks in the Texas High Plains area. Although 
there is good data from actual outbreaks of FMD, such that occurring in the UK in 2001, 
all of the research done with modern day FMD outbreaks in the U.S. are simulations 
performed under hypothetical situations. These studies along with data from actual 
outbreaks are used to examine the potential impact that an FMD outbreak might have on 
a society.  Simulation is used to examine how an animal identification tracking system, 
such as the NAIS, could help reduce society’s vulnerability to FMD. The primary data 
collection involved in this study comes from the High Plains Project (Ward et al., 2007).  
That study included herd characteristics and animal movements in the Texas Panhandle 
area in order to examine vulnerability as well as to improve the epidemiologic engine of 
AUSSPREAD. A High Plains specific version of AUSSPREAD was developed and used 
to simulate scenarios for policy planning and decision making related to intensive 
agricultural settings such as found in the High Plains (Ward et al., 2009). An economic 
analysis of the modeling results was conducted in order to evaluate the economic impact 
of various outbreak scenarios and mitigation strategies.   
The High Plains study region includes an 8 county area in the panhandle of 
Texas. The area covers over 7,900 square miles and in 2002, consisted of 118 feedlots, 
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29 dairies, 88 swine farms, and 1,058 beef cattle premises according to the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) Census of Agriculture (USDA, 2003). This 
region was chosen for its dominant concentration of cattle. Texas is the largest cattle 
production state in the U.S. and the states’ largest agriculture revenue stems from the 
sale of beef cattle. The panhandle region has the most feedlot operations, and with nearly 
6 million cattle on feed (Ward et al., 2007). 
The AUSSPREAD model is a stochastic, state transition susceptible-latent-
infected-recovered (SLIR) model, which operates within a geographic information 
system (GIS) framework. AUSSPREAD uses spatial distributions of livestock species 
and their predicted contact structure to model the spread of FMD over space. Direct and 
indirect contact pathways can also be used to model disease spread. Lastly, the model 
also incorporates disease spread due to sale barns, order buyers, and windborne spread 
from large feedlots and swine facilities.  
The High Plains Study was comprised of three components: data collection and 
survey analysis, epidemic modeling, and economic analysis. The data collection and 
survey analysis component was led by Dr. Bo Norby at Texas A&M University. Dr. 
Norby used in person interviews to collect data from feedlots, beef herds, dairies, swine 
operations, and auction barns. The data collection included the size of the operation, 
animal movements, contacts between different herd types, and seasonal variation in 
contacts and movements. The data were used in the epidemic modeling component of 
the study, which focused on modeling the potential spread of FMD in the High Plains 
region for various introduction and mitigation scenarios. Predictions from the results of 
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the epidemic model were used to design the economic analysis of the study, led by Dr. 
Bruce McCarl.  
The study showed the impact of early vs. late detection, adequate vs. inadequate 
vaccines, and enhanced vs. regular surveillance. Different slaughter strategies were also 
performed where strategies examined the impact of only slaughtering infected animals 
vs. slaughtering infected animals and slaughter of dangerous contacts (dc). These 
comparisons as well as others were done along with 13 different herd types to make a 
total of 64 different scenarios. Tables 4.1 provides all of the default herd types included 
in the High Plains version of AUSSPREAD, where disease spread could reach or initiate 
at (Ward et al., 2009). Table 4.2 shows which herd types were chosen as initial outbreak 
herds for the High Plains Report and all of the 64 different mitigation strategies possible. 
Finally, the comparisons were evaluated to determine which had the most impact on 
reducing the epidemic length and minimizing the financial losses.  
In this study, we will adapt and modify the High Plains version of AUSSPREAD 
to simulate a situation that would assume rapid quicker animal traceback (Ward et al., 
2009). 
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Thirteen herd types were decided based on discussion with TCFA, WTAMU and 
collaborators at TAMU and are summarized in Table 4.1 below: 
 
Table 4.1. Herd Type Summarization 
Herd Type Name Size or Description 
1 Company Owned Feedlot greater than 50,000 head 
2 Stockholder Feedlot more than 20,000 but less than 50,000 
3 Custom Feedlot more than 5,000 but less than 20,000 
4 Backgrounder Feedlot located from a previously compiled list* 
5 Yearling-pasture feedlot less than 5,000 head 
6 Dairy Calf-raiser feedlot only one in study area-10,000 head herd 
7 Small Beef less than 100 cattle 
8 Large Beef more than 100 cattle 
9 Small Dairy less than 1000 dairy cows 
10 Large Dairy more than 1000 dairy cows 
11 Backyard less than 10 animals 
12 Small Ruminant sheep and goats 
13 Swine pig concentrated animal feeding operations 
*description given in the High Plains Report (Ward et al., 2007). 
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Table 4.2. Mitigation Strategies by Index Herd Type 
 Index Outbreak Herd Type 
Strategy Feedlot Type 1 Feedlot Type 4 Large Beef Backyard 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter 
of infected, slaughter of dc’s, early detection 
1 2 3 4 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter 
of infected, slaughter of dc’s, late detection 
5 6 7 8 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter 
of infected, slaughter of dc’s, late detection, 
targeted vaccination, adequate vaccine 
9 10 11 12 
Ring slaughter, regular surveillance, slaughter 
of infected, slaughter of dc’s, late detection, 
targeted vaccination, inadequate vaccine 
13 14 15 16 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infected, 
slaughter of dc’s, early detection 
17 18 19 20 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infected, 
slaughter of dc’s, late detection 
21 22 23 24 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infected, 
slaughter of dc’s, late detection, targeted 
vaccination, adequate vaccine 
25 26 27 28 
Enhanced surveillance, slaughter of infected, 
slaughter of dc’s, late detection, targeted 
vaccination, inadequate vaccine 
29 30 31 32 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, ring vaccination, early detection, 
inadequate vaccine 
33 34 35 36 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance,  early detection 
37 38 39 40 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, late detection, ring vaccination, 
adequate vaccine 
41 42 43 44 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, ring vaccination, late detection, 
inadequate vaccine 
45 46 47 48 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, early detection, targeted 
vaccination, adequate vaccine 
49 50 51 52 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, late detection 
53 54 55 56 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, late detection, targeted 
vaccination, adequate vaccine 
57 58 59 60 
Slaughter of infected, slaughter of dc’s, regular 
surveillance, early detection, ring vaccination, 
adequate vaccine 
61 62 63 64 
*table from The High Plains Report (Ward et al., 2007). 
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IV.2 Procedure 
The study included changing current model parameters reflecting the tracing of 
subsequent herds that may have been in direct contact with the initial outbreak and/or 
herd. In the High Plains modified AUSSPREAD model, there are two probability 
variables that could be changed to affect animal tracing: (1) tracing sensitivity, and (2) 
tracing specificity (Ward et al., 2009). A sensitivity/specificity change in the model 
determines whether these accuracy probabilities have an impact in minimizing the losses 
of a disease outbreak. Tracing sensitivity, set by the user, is a measurement of how 
accurately the model will identify the truly infected herds. Since tracing is unlikely to be 
100% effective, it is also likely to incorrectly assign dangerous contact premise (infected 
herd) status to some contacts that did not get infected (i. e. false positives). Before any 
changes, the current High Plains /AUSSPREAD model has the probability for tracing 
sensitivity and specificity for direct (dangerous) contacts at 85% and 95% respectively. 
The current study performed a parallel shift in the probability variables for the best and 
worst of the saleyard day simulations. The variables for sensitivity and specificity were 
set to 45% and 55% to see any impact on economic “costing” of the outbreaks. 
During any simulation, the AUSSPREAD model keeps track of all the indirect 
and direct contacts, a proportion of which result in new infections. These contacts are 
stored in an 'exposures' file (which records day, source, recipient, type of contact, 
infected?). This forms the basis of tracing. The user can specify how far back to set the 
tracing period. The model will both trace forward and trace back contacts of each 
infected herd when that herd is “found”. The tracing period (days_til_dc) is the time 
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taken to collect and analyze information from the infected premises and identify high 
risk contacts. In other words, days_til_dc are the days until dangerous contacts (dc) are 
found. As a default this is assumed to take between 1 and 3 days after an infected herd is 
identified. Using Australian emergency response terminology, such a trace is classified 
as a 'dangerous contact premise' (DCP). As stated above, the days_til_dc variable is set 
to randomly select between 1, 2, and 3 days to find all the subsequent infected or 
dangerous contacts. 
By changing the parameters on the coded variable, days_til_dc, this study depicts 
faster tracing and portrays outbreaks in a confined time frame. The variable was changed 
to portray outbreaks of FMD where it took 1 day, 2 days, 3 days, 4 days, 6 days, 8 days, 
and 10 days to find all the dangerous contacts in each of these outbreaks. The initial code 
for days_til_dc consisted of:  
days_til_dc=round((rnd(1)*2+1),1).  
This set the time until traced to be between 1 and 3 days. After altering the 
AUSSPREAD model code, the constrained outbreaks were set by changing the variable 
as thus: 
1 day:  days_til_dc=round((1-rnd(1)*.01),1) 
2 days:  days_til_dc=round((2-rnd(1)*.01),1) 
3 days:    days_til_dc=round((3-rnd (1)*.01),1) 
4 days:    days_til_dc=round((4-rnd(1)*.01),1) 
6 days:    days_til_dc=round((6-rnd(1)*.01),1) 
8 days:    days_til_dc=round((8-rnd(1)*.01,1) 
10 days:  days_til_dc=round((10-rnd(1)*.01,1)  
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This set the time until traced to be constrained to the 24th hour of the day before 
the day depicted in order to get the model to trace the subsequent herds as close as 
possible to the desired day. 
Seven runs were simulated through the modified AUSSPREAD and the results 
were used to compare if the range of animal tracing had any effect on the industry 
impact from an outbreak of FMD. The High Plains modified AUSSPREAD model was 
not run for all 64 scenarios as earlier mentioned and listed in Table 4.2. The scenario 
exercised for all of this study’s simulations consisted of: 
• Slaughtering Infected Herds, Slaughtering Dangerous Contacts, Sustaining Regular 
Surveillance, Late Detection (finding the initial outbreak herd/animal at 14 days 
compared to 7 days for early detection). 
These scenarios were numbered 53 through 56 depending on the initial herd type. 
This study will use #53 for Feedlot Type 1 and #55 for Large Beef index herd type. It 
will also use these settings for its Saleyard runs. The scenario was selected in the attempt 
to depict the largest potential impact for subsequent animal tracing. The scenario does 
not include vaccination strategies, as they were deemed more costly than beneficiary in 
the previous High Plains Report (Ward et al., 2007). As noted above, the simulated 
outbreaks were run from three different initial herd types to determine possible 
differences in responses and spreading of the disease. The model was run where the 
outbreaks began at the initial herds and places: Company-owned Feedlot (>50,000 head), 
Large Beef Operation (>100 cattle) and a saleyard located in the study area. 
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The large beef operation was run through the model for tracing periods lasting 
only 1, 2 and, 3 days to see if the difference in tracing periods had any increasing cost 
effects. This large beef herd type was not chosen for any specific reason, but the totals 
for all the costs were calculated in the same manner as the saleyard and feedlot runs. 
After the large beef herd runs were completed, seven model runs were performed using 
the company-owned feedlot (type 1) as the initial herd. A proiri expectations were to see 
large beginning losses, but a smaller percentage increase as the tracing period progressed 
since the operation does not have the ability that a large beef operation or a saleyard 
does in spreading the disease outward. The Feedlot was run for all seven different 
tracing periods and was followed by all the calculations to gather the different costs of 
the outbreak. A short welfare study was completed on the least costly and most costly 
tracing periods to see another effect of the animal traceability on the outbreak. After all 
the feedlot runs were finished, the saleyard runs were run through the High Plains 
version of AUSSPREAD, again including all seven trace periods. The saleyard runs 
were undertaken to determine the highest disease incidence, and the most exponential 
losses as the tracing period increased from 1 day to 10 days. In addition to the first seven 
runs, two more runs were completed with the saleyard’s least costly and most costly 
tracing periods. These runs are those discussed above in the context of the tracing 
sensitivity and specificity probabilities. With all of the different herd types and tracing 
period strategies, the High Plains modified AUSSPREAD was run a total of 19 times to 
collect the necessary results for the simulated Foot and Mouth Disease outbreaks. 
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The data was used to create an economic cost analysis for each model run in 
order to present the effectiveness of animal tracing in the event of a purposeful 
introduction of FMD. For each Herd Type and trace period costs were tabulated for 
slaughter, euthanasia, disposal, cleaning/disinfection, and disposal. These costs were 
totaled for each simulation and then the average, minimum, and maximum were figured 
to get values that can be compared across the increasing trace periods. The feedlot and 
saleyard runs were performed for a total of 100 simulations and the large beef operation 
for 50 simulations. Considering the AUSSPREAD model has been underutilized for 
animal tracing analysis, more accurate values were anticipated when completing all 
seven trace periods for the feedlot and saleyard runs. The above mentioned costs were 
figured in the same manner as was done in the High Plains Report and were as follows: 
• The cost of appraisal for slaughter for small (<100 head), medium (100-500 head) 
and large (>500 head) herds was assumed to be $300, $400, and $500 per herd, 
respectively. 
• Euthanasia costs were assumed to be $5 per head, regardless of herd type. 
• The cost of disposal of a culled herd was assumed to be $11 per head in small (<100) 
and medium (100-500) herds, and $12 per head in large (>500) herds. 
• The cost of cleaning and disinfection for small (<100), medium (100-500) and large 
(>500) herds was assumed to be $5000, $7000, and $10000 per herd, respectively. 
• Fixed surveillance costs were assumed to be $150, $200, and $400, for small (<100 
head), medium (100-500) and large (>500) herds (Ward et al., 2007).  
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For each of these costs, the infected animals which would have to be disposed of 
had to be separated from those unaffected animals. These calculations and actions were 
performed through Microsoft Excel, as were all the other calculations for the economic 
costs of the outbreaks. 
Forgone Income and Indemnity Payments set up by the government were 
calculated along with the other costs to see the impact of animal traceability. The High 
Plains report provided the 2004 market dollar values and daily revenues given by the 
USDA (Table 4.3), along with a composition table of herds by animal type proportions 
(Table 4.4), to find the indemnity payments and forgone income for each AUSSPREAD 
model run. The total infected/dead livestock had to be separated into their different herd 
types. From there, they were multiplied by their composition and either the indemnity 
payment dollar value or the forgone income daily revenue. Forgone income represented 
the stream of future income that was no longer available and represented the time from 
when the herd was depopulated until the premise was allowed to repopulate and regain 
its normal production. The future stream of income was a rough estimation and could 
include the weight gained in a feedlot, lost milk production in a dairy, or the gain from 
birthing a calf. The future income did not include the loss of capital assets such as 
breeding genetics. The forgone daily income values were multiplied by 60, since the 
High Plains report estimated that producers whose cattle were culled due to infection 
were kept out of business for at least 60 days (Ward et al. 2007). Finally, the values were 
separated and totaled in their respective simulations. Minimum and maximum averages 
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were determined in order to compare the values across the different tracing periods to 
again see the impact of traceability. 
As stated before a small welfare analysis with the least and most costly feedlot 
trace periods was performed. The AUSSPREAD model was developed with the 
capability to calculate losses associated with quarantine with and without provisions to 
move feed into the quarantined areas. Quarantine associated welfare slaughter losses 
only applied to herds which had a status of “susceptible” and fell within a movement 
restriction zone. These animals were not deemed as infected or a dangerous contact. The 
losses did not apply to grazing operations, backyard operations, and herds of less than 
fifty animals since they were assumed to be self sufficient and not requiring any outside 
food source. In the cases where movement of feed was allowed, the assumption used 
was that feed was delivered to the quarantined herds at a cost of $1.25 per animal per 
day. This cost was to cover disinfection of feed trucks that would enter and exit the 
premises. If feed was not allowed, then after 8 days the herd was assumed to be culled 
and there was no salvage value. 8 days was chosen as an optimistic view of how long the 
cattle operation could operate normally with feed on hand. The quarantine feed costs 
were done to a maximum of 60 days as that was the model’s assumption for how long a 
producer would be kept out of business. The welfare slaughter animals were destroyed 
because of restricted movement and were slaughtered since it was assumed that the  
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Table 4.3. Values and Daily Revenues for Herd Types 
Indemnity 
Payments 
 
Forgone Income 
Herd Types 
 
 
Dollar Value 
Daily 
Revenue 
Revenue for  
60 days 
Heifer under 600 lbs -$411/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Steer under 600 lbs -$411/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Heifer under 800 lbs -$693/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Steer under 800 lbs -$693/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Heifer under 1000 lbs -$900/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Steer under 1000 lbs -$900/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Heifer under 1200 lbs -$1138/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Steer under 1200 lbs -$1138/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Heifer under 1400 lbs -$1250/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Steer under 1400 lbs -$1250/head .$33/head $19.8/head 
Milk Cow -$1850/head $8.6/head $516/head 
Ewes (adult female sheep) under 160 lbs -$90/head $.10/head $6/head 
Rams (adult male sheep) under 230 lbs -$128/head $.10/head $6/head 
Male lamb (young male sheep) 90 lbs -$105/head $.10/head $6/head 
Female lamb (young female sheep) 80 lbs -$93/head $.10/head $6/head 
Male Yearling (baby male sheep) 60 lbs -$70/head $.10/head $6/head 
Female Yearling baby female sheep) 50 lbs -$58/head $.10/head $6/head 
Boar (adult male pig) 200-250 lbs -$96/head $.18/head $10.8.head 
Sow (adult female pig) 180-250 lbs -$85/head $.18/head $10.8.head 
Male piglet 100-180 lbs -$60/head $.18/head $10.8.head 
Female piglet 100-180 lbs -$60/head $.18/head $10.8.head 
Male piglet   -$50/head $.18/head $10.8.head 
Female piglet 100-180 lbs -$60/head $.18/head $10.8.head 
Notes: Types of animals and associated dollar values and corresponding daily revenues 
were assumed to be as above. 
 
*table values and revenues provided in The High Plains Report (Ward et al., 2007). 
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Table 4.4. Composition of Herds by Animal Type 
Herd Types 
 
Animal 
Types Y
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Steer 600  0.17       0.24 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.25   0.2 0.17 0.17 
Heifer 600 0.17 0.06 0.15   0.24 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.15   0.2 0.17 0.17 
Steer 800 0.11       0.1 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.35   0.1 0.11 0.11 
Heifer 800 0.11 0.06 0.18   0.1 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.25   0.2 0.11 0.11 
Steer 1000 0.21       0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2     0.1 0.21 0.21 
Heifer 1000 0.21 0.06 0.17   0.01 0.11 0.11 0.11     0.2 0.21 0.21 
Steer 1200 0.01       0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05       0.01 0.01 
Heifer 1200 0.01         0.03 0.03 0.03       0.01 0.01 
Steer 1400           0.02 0.02 0.02           
Heifer 1400           0.01 0.01 0.01           
Milk cow   0.82 0.5                     
Ewes                   0.31       
Rams                   0.1       
Male lambs                   0.13       
Female lambs                   0.12       
Male yearling       0.1           0.23       
Female 
yearling 
      0.01           0.11       
Boar       0.3                   
Sow       0.3                   
Male piglet       0.07                   
Female piglet       0.08                   
Baby Male 
piglet 
      0.08                   
Baby Female 
piglet 
      0.06                   
*table presented in The High Plains Report (Ward et al., 2007). 
 
42 
 
 
producer either did not see future returns for keeping the animals alive; or could not 
continue feeding his animals due to unattainable funds to pay for the feed if movement 
was allowed, or if not allowed, on the farm feed was vacant. 
According to the High Plains FMD costing model created by Levan Elbakidze 
(2008), welfare slaughter losses include slaughter costs, forgone income, and indemnity 
payments for the animals destroyed. All of these costs were evaluated the exact same 
way as with the dangerous and infected herds. In the AUSSPREAD model, there are 
variables identified as restricted and When_res. The restricted variable was used as a 
dummy variable (either 0 or 1) to classify a herd as within a quarantine zone or not. The 
When_res simulation variable was defined as a number of days a farm had been 
restricted and listed any number of days as its output. If this variable listed a number of 
or over 8 days, then the herd was assumed to be culled without any salvage value or 
slaughter gain. 
Since welfare slaughter only affected those producers who could not sustain their 
herds with grazing pastures, the model affected the herd types: company owned feedlot, 
stockholder feedlot, custom feedlot, backgrounder feedlot, yearling-pasture feedlot, 
dairy calf raiser feedlot, small dairy, large dairy, and swine. The resulting data from 
using the High Plains version of AUSSPREAD would be examined to find all the 
animals that would have to be culled, and from those numbers and the herd composition 
table, the model’s user could calculate the slaughter costs, forgone income, and 
indemnity payments (Ward et al., 2009). This procedure will be performed in this study 
to see the impact welfare slaughter can have in the event of a FMD outbreak. 
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All of the cost results were compared across the range of tracing period (1 to 10 
days) for all the outbreaks to determine the total economic impact. As is with most 
research in this field, the total economic costs will be incomplete due to factors such as 
the inability to predict closing export markets and how much prices may change after an 
outbreak. It is difficult to simulate every cost that will develop after an outbreak, but this 
research demonstrates a good portion of the industry impact, and how traceability can 
affect that impact. After the comparison of results, previous research done on animal 
tracking systems will be compared with our results to see if such a system is feasible and 
can be economically justified. The implementation costs as well as the potential costs for 
employees who do the animal tracking, slaughter, and etc will be examined and figured 
to compare to our outbreak scenarios. The cost analysis and the financial costs of an 
outbreak under animal tracing constraints will be compared to see if such control 
responses can make a difference in reducing the harmful effects of a FMD outbreak. 
The research was done in this way to see if an animal identification and tracking 
system is worth implementation. The initial hypothesis was that an outbreak constrained 
over different period of days will show how effective an animal identification and 
tracking system such as NAIS could be in controlling the outbreak. The thought was that 
the system could pay for itself in one outbreak with the economic losses it would 
prevent. Although the model is unable to account for markets closing and price 
volatility, nor determining the money saved if markets do not close. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
RESULTS 
The results from the alternative tracing periods in the AUSSPREAD model are 
presented, along with the costs of each individual FMD outbreak in the Texas High 
Plains. The cost analyses included slaughter of infected herds, disinfection of dangerous 
locations, euthanasia of infected herds, surveillance of the infected and surrounding 
areas, and disposal of the dead livestock. Forgone income, indemnity payments, 
quarantine costs, and welfare slaughter figures were also compared. The difference in 
the tracing periods as they increased from 1 day up to 10 days were scrutinized as far as 
percentage change, probability distribution of infected herd types, and overall impact to 
the U.S. Beef and Agricultural Industry. 
V.1 Large Beef Operation Results 
The results from the Large Beef Operation runs, presented in Table 5.1, indicated 
that animal tracing does have an effect on the economic costs of an outbreak.  Although 
they did not jump tremendously, all costs increased on average from 1 day to 3 days, 
except for forgone income from the 2 day trace period to the 3 day trace period. The 
average infected and culled livestock increased from 5,493 (1 day) to 6,291 (2 days) to 
6,825 (3 days). This was a percentage increase of 14.5% from 1 to 2 days and an 8.5% 
increase from 2 to 3 days. The euthanasia costs had the same percentage increase that the 
dead livestock had, which reflects the costs of euthanasia ($5 per head). 
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Table 5.1. Large Beef Operation FMD Outbreak Costs 
Trace Periods  
Costs Trace dc 1 day Trace dc 2 days Trace dc 3 days 
Dead Livestock 
    
Minimum 947 947 947 
Maximum 49,036 49,036 84,982 
Average 5,493 6,291 6,825 
  
    
Euthanasia Costs 
    
Minimum $4,735 $4,735 $4,735 
Maximum $245,180 $245,180 $424,910 
Average $27,464 $31,457 $34,125 
  
    
Slaughter Costs 
    
Minimum $800 $800 $800 
Maximum $9,200 $9,700 $11,200 
Average $3,066 $3,166 $3,316 
  
    
Cleaning/Disinfection Costs 
   
Minimum $15,000 $15,000 $15,000 
Maximum $162,000 $174,000 $196,000 
Average $54,800 $56,720 $59,120 
  
    
Surveillance Costs 
    
Minimum $550 $550 $550 
Maximum $5,200 $5,750 $6,200 
Average $1,815 $1,886 $1,946 
  
    
Disposal Costs 
    
Minimum $11,351 $11,351 $11,351 
Maximum $588,330 $588,330 $1,017,015 
Average $65,422 $74,960 $81,298 
  
    
Forgone Income 
    
Minimum $18,751 $18,751 $18,751 
Maximum $970,913 $1,773,541 $1,682,644 
Average $107,925 $156,298 $134,312 
  
    
Indemnity Payments 
    
Minimum $656,233 $656,233 $656,233 
Maximum $37,136,467 $37,136,467 $64,149,927 
Average $3,885,004 $4,564,914 $4,903,179 
  
    
Total 
    
Minimum $707,420 $707,420 $707,420 
Maximum $39,117,289 $39,932,968 $67,487,895 
Average $4,145,496 $4,889,402 $5,217,296 
 
*Cattle numbers and dollar amounts are estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD 
simulation model (Ward et al., 2009). 
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The euthanasia costs went from $27,464 US dollars to $31,457 to $34,125 for 
each of the trace periods. Disposal costs ranged from $65,422 to $81,298. Cleaning and 
disinfection costs ranged from $54,800 to $59,120 for the three different outbreaks. The 
percentage increases between outbreaks for disposal was 14.6% and 8.5% and for 
cleaning and disinfection, 3.5% and 4.2%, respectively. Other than slaughter costs, 
cleaning and disinfection costs were the only other cost figure to go up in percentage 
increase from the 2 day trace period to the 3 day trace period. Slaughter costs had a 
percentage increase of 3.3% (3,066 to 3,166) to 4.7% (3,166 to 3,316). Surveillance 
costs had the least amount of impact of the outbreak and its costs ranged from $1,815 to 
$1,946 with percentage increases of 3.9% and 3.2%. Graphical representations of these 
increases in the dead livestock numbers and average economic costs are presented in 
Figures 5.1-5.3.  
Forgone income and indemnity payments had the most impact of the economic 
costs for all the different FMD outbreak simulations. In the large beef operation runs, the 
forgone income average went from $107,925 to $156,298 for a percentage increase of 
44.8%, but then went down to $134,312 for a percentage decrease of -14.1%.. The 
percentage decrease had more to do with what types of animals were infected and where 
they came from then any other factor. In this instance, the “trace dc 2 days” simulation 
had the outbreak reach a large dairy which created substantial forgone income losses. 
The other outbreaks (Trace dc 1, 3 days) did not reach any dairies, but did reach 
different feedlots which still provided substantial forgone income.  
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.1. Dead Livestock from Large Beef Operation FMD Outbreaks 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.2. Average Economic Costs from Large Beef Operation FMD Outbreaks: 
Part A 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.3. Average Economic Costs from Large Beef Operation FMD Outbreaks: 
Part B           
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Figure 5.4. Maximum Economic Costs from Large Beef Operation FMD 
Outbreaks: Part A 
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Figure 5.5. Maximum Economic Costs from Large Beef Operation FMD 
Outbreaks: Part B 
 
 
Although, the producers lost income in these simulated outbreaks, the largest loss 
would be for the government and industry due to indemnity payments. The payments for 
the three outbreaks averaged $4,451,032. The indemnity payment average went from 
$3,885,004 to $4,564,914 for a percentage increase of nearly 18%, and then increased 
again to $4,903,179 for another percentage increase of 7.4%. Although the average total 
costs of the three different trace period outbreaks ranged from $4,145,496 to $5,217,296, 
the worst case scenarios (maximum costs) suggest how detrimental an outbreak can be. 
The maximum economic costs for the large beef operation FMD outbreaks are shown in 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5. In the worst case scenarios, the difference between the tracing days 
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1 and 2 was $815,679. This figure may not be significant when considering how large 
the difference was ($27,554,927) between the tracing days 2 and 3. The percent increase 
in costs between the tracing day 1 and 3 is significant (73%). The fact that the maximum 
loss of infected/dead livestock was the same in trace days 1 and 2 can account for how 
similar the total worst case losses were for both of those trace days.   
For the average totals, the differences between the tracing changes are not as 
large as the worst case scenarios, but they are still significant. There is still more than a 
million dollars difference (actual $1,160,292) between the changes from setting the 
subsequent herd tracing from 1 to 3 days. This is the equivalent of a 24% increase in 
costs, which shows the benefits of the increased tracing maybe more than the actual 
financial difference. The average number of dead livestock from the simulated FMD 
outbreaks increased along with the increased days until the subsequent herds was found. 
The differences in the averages were not large, but the difference between the maximum 
dead from the Trace dc 3 days outbreak to the 1 day and 2 days outbreak was 
considerable (35,946 animals). 
The AUSSPREAD model showed in these runs, where an outbreak started at 
Large Beef Operation, that as it takes longer to find the subsequent infected herds of an 
outbreak, then the more animals will likely be infected and will accordingly make the 
outbreak losses increase substantially. Although the averages of the results did not show 
huge changes in the amount of dead livestock and financial losses for the industry, there 
were increases in every cost, except one, for all the simulation runs. The small changes 
could have been accounted by the model, with the probability for tracing sensitivity 
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(85%) being so high. Later test results show the effect of the tracing sensitivity/ 
specificity probability values. One interesting fact was that for most of these costs, the 
percent increase in costs went down from the outbreaks of trace dc 1 day and trace dc 2 
days to the outbreaks of trace dc 2 days and trace dc 3 days. One important result from 
the data collected was visible in probability distribution graphs of the total costs from the 
large beef FMD outbreaks, shown in Figure 5.6. The distribution figure demonstrated 
that the outbreaks’ averages stay close throughout the different tracing periods, but the 
tail ends of the costs go further, much further, in the trace dc 3 days outbreak compared 
to the trace dc 1 and 2 day outbreaks. Although it is hard to tell with only 3 different 
trace period outbreaks, the PDF graphs imply that maximum costs or worst case 
scenarios occur more as the trace periods get larger. If anything else, it would seem that 
controlled traceability could reduce the extreme outcomes or maximum costs of an FMD 
outbreak. Further study of the probability distributions with other FMD simulated 
outbreaks will be analyzed in this study to deem if the above statements could be valid.  
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
                       Figure 5.6. Probability Distribution Function Approximations of Large Beef Operation FMD Outbreaks 
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Through these three runs, traceability appeared to have some effect on the costs 
of an FMD outbreak. Since the AUSSPREAD model worked as the user assumed, other 
FMD simulations were chosen to hopefully see larger losses and larger disease spread 
through the different premises, i.e., Company Owned Feedlot and a Saleyard. These 
simulations are discussed in the next sections. 
V.2 Company Owned Feedlot Results 
The largest feedlot of the 6 different types of feedlots in the modified Texas High 
Plains AUSSPREAD model was Type 1, the company owned feedlot, which holds at a 
minimum 50,000 animals. If an outbreak of FMD started at a feedlot then, presumably a 
large group of animals would be immediately infected and euthanized. The hypothesis 
was that the costs would be large in the beginning with minimal increase in costs as it 
took longer to find all the subsequent infected animals. Although the results shown in 
Table 5.2 below seemed to concur at times, the costs did not always increase from trace 
period 1 day to trace period 10 days:  
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Table 5.2. Company Owned Feedlot FMD Outbreak Costs 
 
     
  Trace Periods 
Costs 
Trace dc 1 
day 
Trace dc 2 
days 
Trace dc 3 
days 
Trace dc 4 
days 
Trace dc 6 
days 
Trace dc 8 
days 
Trace dc 10 
days 
Dead Livestock         
Minimum 67,061 67,785 67,942 66,896 67,883 66,294 67,306 
Maximum 228,029 206,565 247,929 240,277 267,676 271,758 361,611 
Average 105,165 99,873 101,744 100,108 105,446 102,134 108,784 
Euthanasia Costs         
Minimum $335,305 $338,925 $339,710 $334,480 $339,415 $331,470 $336,530 
Maximum $1,140,145 $1,032,825 $1,239,645 $1,201,385 $1,338,380 $1,358,790 $1,808,055 
Average $525,826 $499,363 $508,719 $500,541 $527,232 $510,668 $543,921 
Slaughter Costs         
Minimum $5,400 $6,500 $6,800 $6,900 $7,500 $7,300 $7,800 
Maximum $46,500 $60,200 $51,400 $40,100 $47,300 $41,600 $61,700 
Average $19,710 $18,111 $17,846 $19,205 $18,898 $19,900 $21,406 
Cleaning/Disinfection Costs        
Minimum $98,000 $116,000 $131,000 $133,000 $133,000 $133,000 $142,000 
Maximum $822,000 $1,050,000 $930,000 $735,000 $818,000 $732,000 $1,086,000 
Average $347,120 $319,140 $322,040 $345,210 $332,590 $350,160 $376,640 
Surveillance Costs         
Minimum $3,300 $6,500 $4,300 $4,550 $4,350 $4,550 $4,650 
Maximum $26,700 $60,200 $30,800 $23,900 $25,750 $23,500 $34,900 
Average $11,195 $18,111 $10,401 $11,119 $10,721 $11,279 $12,110 
Disposal Costs         
Minimum $803,415 $811,826 $814,490 $799,856 $812,811 $793,234 $806,179 
Maximum $2,730,685 $2,469,058 $2,968,517 $2,877,911 $3,206,121 $3,256,469 $4,328,047 
Average $1,258,411 $1,195,180 $1,217,610 $1,197,793 $1,261,976 $1,222,053 $1,301,495 
Forgone Income         
Minimum $1,327,808 $1,337,935 $1,332,183 $1,324,541 $1,348,921 $1,312,621 $1,318,624 
Maximum $15,717,605 $17,580,600 $17,506,825 $18,702,536 $14,213,246 $15,131,111 $12,962,919 
Average $3,002,298 $2,854,800 $2,814,976 $2,782,517 $2,687,762 $2,535,060 $3,030,334 
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  Trace Periods 
Costs 
Trace dc 1 
day 
Trace dc 2 
days 
Trace dc 3 
days 
Trace dc 4 
days 
Trace dc 6 
days 
Trace dc 8 
days 
Trace dc 10 
days 
Indemnity Payments        
Minimum $50,679,231  $51,128,449  $50,715,421  $50,564,292  $51,234,058  $50,147,130  $50,233,618  
Maximum $187,499,805  $170,875,002  $186,814,614  $209,863,217  $201,892,871  $225,258,690  $281,626,777  
Average $80,410,600  $77,289,257  $77,627,119  $76,368,954  $79,965,746  $77,156,903  $82,953,937  
Total        
Minimum $53,252,458  $53,746,136  $53,343,904  $53,167,619  $53,880,055  $52,729,305  $52,849,401  
Maximum $207,983,440  $193,127,885  $209,541,801  $233,444,049  $221,541,669  $245,802,160  $301,908,398  
Average $85,575,159  $82,193,962  $82,518,710  $81,225,338  $84,804,925  $81,806,023  $88,239,842  
*Cattle numbers and dollar amounts are estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009).
Table 5.2. Continued 
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There were many times that the average costs and maximum costs fluctuated over the 
increased number of days. A surprising occurrence was how high the trace period 1 day 
costs were compared to the simulations for the other trace periods. 
Although there seemed to be a slight upward trend in the charted data for all the 
costs, presented in Figures 5.7 - 5.13, the AUSSPREAD model’s results seemed curious 
compared to practical thought when considering traceability and increased outbreak 
length. One clear result was how much more the total outbreak losses were compared to 
the simulated runs for the outbreaks initiated from a large beef operation. The total 
losses from the feedlot simulations ranged from $81,223,338 to $88,239,842 for the 
average costs and $193,127,885 to $301,908,398 for the maximum costs. The indemnity 
payments accounted for most of these applied costs, ranging between 88% to 95% of the 
total costs. The original High Plains report estimated the average range of costs for a 
type 1 outbreak was $66.7 to $538.6 million, and the maximum costs were $128.7 to 
$981.7 million dollars (Ward et al., 2007).
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.7. Dead Livestock from Feedlot Type 1 FMD Outbreaks  
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
5.8. Average Economic Costs from Feedlot Type 1 FMD Outbreaks: Part A 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.9. Average Economic Costs from Feedlot Type 1 FMD Outbreaks: Part B
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.10. Average Economic Costs from Feedlot Type FMD Outbreaks: Part C 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.11. Maximum Economic Costs from Feedlot Type 1 FMD Outbreaks: 
Part A           
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.12. Maximum Economic Costs from Feedlot Type 1 FMD Outbreaks: 
 Part B 
   
  
60 
$0
$50,000,000
$100,000,000
$150,000,000
$200,000,000
$250,000,000
$300,000,000
$350,000,000
Trace dc 1 day Trace dc 2 days Trace dc 3 days Trace dc 4 days Trace dc 6 days Trace dc 8 days Trace dc 10 days
Trace Periods
L
o
ss
e
s 
in
 U
S
 D
o
ll
a
rs
Maximum Indemnity Payments Total Maximum Costs
 
*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.13. Maximum Economic Costs from Feedlot Type 1 FMD Outbreaks: 
Part C 
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The High Plains report gave the same cost figures for outbreaks simulated from a 
large beef operation (Table 5.3). The range of economic costs given in Table 5.3, include 
other cost figures not analyzed on every run performed for this research. For example, 
welfare costs, quarantine costs, and cost of vaccination were not included. It is also 
important to note that each scenario was used in the High Plains Report. However, this 
research only used one set of scenarios for the simulations. Of all the costs that were 
examined, forgone income and disposal costs were the other noteworthy costs that had a 
sizable amount of impact on the entire outbreak. Disposal costs were the smaller of the 
two and ranged from $1,195,180 to $1,301,495 for its average costs and ranged from 
$2,469,058 to $4,328,047 for maximum costs. Forgone income consisted from 3% to 8% 
of the outbreak total costs and ranged from $2,535,060 to $3,030,334 for average costs, 
and ranged from $12,962,919 to $18,702,536 for maximum costs. One item that was 
evident in the feedlot simulations was that almost every average and maximum was the 
highest on the trace period, trace dc 10 days. The two outliers were the average 
surveillance costs for trace dc 2 days and the maximum forgone income values for trace 
dc 4 days. These differences may be due to the costs’ structure since the average infected 
(108.784) and maximum infected (361,611) livestock were higher within the trace dc 10 
days outbreak than any other. The two figures that seemed to stand out the most were 
trace dc 2 days and trace dc 10 days. These two outbreaks consistently had lower losses 
(2 days) or higher losses (10 days) than any of the outbreaks. These data confirm 
previous animal traceability research.  
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Table 5.3. Range of Economic Costs for the High Plains Report 
Range of Economic Costs Using Different 
Mitigation Strategies in $1 millions 
Type of Herds 
 
Minimum 
Values 
Maximum 
Values 
Average 
Values 
Median 
Values 
Within Feedlot Type 1 55.5-246.8 128.7-981.7 66.7-538.6 62.9-546 
Within Large Beef 0.77-3.8 42-597.8 3.5-159.1 1.1-79.3 
*(Ward et al., 2007) 
 
 
Another outlier was the cost of the trace dc 1 day outbreak since it was not the 
least costly. The anticipated result that it would be the least costly of the outbreaks could 
be explained by AUSSPREAD’s random simulations and how close all the feedlot 
outbreaks were in regards to economic costs. Since practical thought is that disease 
spread might not move far out of a feedlot because of lack of livestock transported 
outward, the similarity of the outbreaks costs can be rationalized. It is important to note 
that trace dc 1 day was the second least costly of the outbreaks in regards to maximum 
infected livestock. The percentage change for the shortest time to find all the subsequent 
herds, trace dc 1 day, to the longest time, trace dc 10 days, can be considered when 
looking at the impact of traceability. Losses in terms of infected livestock and euthanasia 
costs were an increase of 3.5% for the averages, and an increase of 59% for the 
maximums. Slaughter average costs went up 8.6% on average and increased 32.6% for 
the maximum costs. Cleaning and Disinfection costs also increased on average, 8.5%, 
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and increased 32% for the maximum cost. Surveillance costs had the least amount of 
total impact, but increased 8% for its average and increased to 30% for the maximum 
cost. Disposal costs percentage change was 3.4% for the average costs and 59% for the 
maximum cost. Forgone income and indemnity payments accounted for most of the total 
costs of the outbreak and for forgone income, the percentage change was a small 1% 
increase for the average costs and a negative 18% decrease for the maximum costs. This 
decrease was more than likely due to the first outbreak spreading to a dairy(s) where 
although the animals might be fewer, they are worth more income on a daily basis. 
Lastly, the Indemnity Payment percentage change was a 3% increase for the average 
costs and a substantial 50% increase for the maximum costs.  
 Since probability distribution function approximations were used in the large 
beef FMD outbreaks to show traceability’s effectiveness in minimizing the occurrences 
of extreme outcomes or losses from a FMD outbreak, a similar analysis was completed 
with the total cost data from the feedlot outbreaks. In the large beef operation outbreaks, 
only three trace periods were used, thus limiting our analysis of the PDF graphs. For the 
feedlot outbreaks, PDFs of all the applied trace periods (trace dc 1 day to trace dc 10 
days), presented in Figure 5.14, allowed for a more complete analysis. Whereas before, 
calculations and cost results from the feedlot outbreaks gave few conclusions on how 
impactful traceability can be in minimizing the effect of an FMD outbreak, the PDF 
figures presented consistent results with the large beef operation outbreak simulations. 
The PDFs for all the trace periods presented that the most probable of the total costs to 
occur were in the range of 66 to 70 million dollars. This is well below the average 
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calculations for all the different trace periods. Yet, the markers for 50% of the cost 
observations ended close to the average cost calculations. The PDFs also show that the 
longest trace period, trace dc 10 days, has the longest PDF tail or the worst possible 
outcome from an outbreak. The trace dc 10 days outbreak also had the largest range of 
total costs before 50% of the simulations were figured (lowest PDF arc line in figure), 
which depicts it having the widest range of total costs across all the simulations. The 
PDFs again defend that traceability can reduce the instances where the maximum losses 
can be incurred from an FMD outbreak. The PDF figure shows that the two largest trace 
periods have the longest tails, which show that those outbreaks contain the highest cost 
observations. It is also important, although hard to tell in Figure 5.14, that the three 
smallest trace periods (trace dc 1 day, 2 days, and 3 days) have the smallest PDF tails 
among all the different outbreaks. The PDF figures show similar results as far as their 
cost observations being in a similar range of dollars, and all show a long tail of higher 
costs at a smaller number of observations. This describes how animal traceability may 
not show large decreases in costs as it is intensified, but it supports how animal tracing 
reduces the number of potential extreme or worst case outcomes in a FMD outbreak. It 
also helps that the PDF tails (worst case observations) seem to decrease as the trace 
periods of subsequent infected animal tracing is increased.  
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.14. Probability Distribution Function Approximations of Company Owned Feedlot FMD Outbreaks 
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Since the trace dc 2 days and trace dc 10 days outbreaks were the best and worst 
of all the outbreaks for total costs, a small welfare study was performed to see how 
traceability may affect those costs. It is noteworthy that the percentage changes from the 
trace dc 2 days to trace dc 10 days outbreaks would be greater than the changes 
presented above since the trace dc 10 days showed fewer total costs. 
V.3 Welfare Slaughter Study Results 
The AUSSPREAD model had the capability to tabulate the quarantine costs with 
and without provisions to move feed into the quarantined areas. The associated welfare 
losses only dealt with those susceptible to infection and within a restricted movement 
area. To demonstrate further the relationship between animal traceability and economic 
losses due to an animal disease outbreak, the best and worst simulated feedlot outbreaks 
were used to calculate the disinfection costs to allow feed movement to the herds and 
also the welfare slaughter losses that would occur without feed allowed to the herds.   
The welfare losses include the slaughter costs, forgone income of the lost 
animals, and the indemnity payments given to the producers. The quarantine costs, the 
disinfection costs of the feed trucks, for the trace dc 2 days outbreak was on average 
$3,042,971, but had a maximum of $20,700,000. These costs do not include the actual 
cost of feed or any labor costs. The worst outbreak, trace dc 10 days, averaged 
$4,622,412 for quarantine costs with feed movement and had a maximum of 
$23,561,625. The percentage change for the averages was a 52% increase and the 
maximum was a 14% increase. The slaughter costs of the two simulated model runs had 
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Table 5.4. Welfare Slaughter Costs 
  Trace Periods 
Costs Trace dc 2 day Trace dc 10 day 
Quarantine Costs     
Average $3,042,971 $4,622,412 
Maximum $20,700,000 $23,561,625 
  
    
Slaughter Costs     
Average $1,700 $2,470 
Maximum $6,500 $8,000 
      
Forgone Income     
Average $3,847,693 $5,635,891 
Maximum $23,367,696 $27,786,446 
      
Indemnity Payments     
Average $37,048,342 $55,927,434 
Maximum $248,061,600 $256,277,762 
      
Total Welfare Slaughter Losses     
Average  $40,897,735 $61,565,794 
Maximum $271,435,796 $284,072,208 
      
Total Economic Losses*     
Average  $123,091,697 $149,805,637 
Maximum $464,563,681 $585,980,606 
*Cattle numbers and dollar amounts are estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD 
simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
*Total Economic Losses calculated with assumption that quarantine costs were too expensive and welfare 
slaughter losses were accounted for in their place. 
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a 45% increase in their average losses and a 23% increase in the maximum losses. The 
actual values as well as all the other cost figures for the welfare analysis are shown in 
Table 5.4 and Figures 5.15-5.18. The forgone income losses were slightly larger than 
those of the quarantine costs. For trace dc 2 days, forgone income averaged $3,847,693, 
but could have cost up to $23,367,696. For trace dc 10 days, the average costs were 
$5,635,891, but could cost the producer up to $27,786,446.  Between the two, the 
averages increased 46% and the maximum losses increased 19%. The dilemma for the 
producer is that he may not have the income to feed the animals and the disinfection 
costs for the trucks, but the losses seem lower than with the quarantine costs with feed 
movement than with the losses from forgone income. The dilemma is that since these 
animals were not infected, the producers also will not be given the indemnity payments 
provided by the government. The total indemnity payments not received averaged 
$37,048,342 for trace dc 2 days outbreak and up to $55,927,434 for the trace dc 10 days, 
a 51% increase. The maximum losses from indemnity payments reached up to 
$248,061,600 for the trace dc 2 days outbreak and up to $256,277,762 for the trace 10 
days outbreak. This was also a percentage increase of 3.3%. Under the current U.S. 
policy on quarantine zones, these payments may be enticing enough so that producers 
are induced to transport their animals TO infected areas in hopes of receiving the 
payments. This creates a moral hazard problem. Those actions would be high risk to 
spread the disease further and possibly make the disease difficult to control. The total 
welfare losses averaged $40,897,735 for trace dc 2 days outbreak and $61,565,795 for 
the trace dc 10 days outbreak. With these changes in animal tracing, there 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.15. Welfare Slaughter Analysis-Slaughter Costs 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.16. Welfare Slaughter Analysis-Forgone Income 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.17. Welfare Slaughter Analysis-Indemnity Payments    
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.18. Welfare Slaughter Analysis-Quarantine and Total Welfare Slaughter 
Losses 
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was a 51% increase in average welfare slaughter losses. There was only a 5% increase in 
losses from the maximum welfare slaughter costs. Yet, the difference in the losses from 
the average to the maximum was vast. The trace dc 2 days outbreak losses were 
$271,435,796 and the trace dc 10 days outbreak was $284,072,208. The quarantine costs 
suggest a benefit if the producer can still gain off other production such as milk from 
dairy cows, but it may be hard to afford those costs when the producer is unable to 
receive income from production elsewhere. The producer may also consider the costs of 
transporting feed into the quarantine zone compared to the indemnity payments he or she 
would receive if they slaughtered their animals. Even if the indemnity payments were 
substantial, the producer would lose his entire herd, breeding stock/genetic pool, and 
more than likely his annual income which would certainly be a difficult decision, 
especially if there are limited options. If the producer could not afford the quarantine 
costs to move in feed to their premise, the welfare slaughter losses would make the 
average cost of the feedlot outbreaks to total $123,091,697 (for trace dc 2 days) and 
$149,805,637 for (trace dc 10 days). The difference in animal traceability accounted for 
a difference of $26,713,940 and a 22% increase in total losses. The maximum total 
losses went up a similar 26% percent and made the losses $464,563,681 (for trace dc 2 
days) and $585,980,606 (for trace dc 10 days). These losses look different than those in 
Table 5.3, but are within the ranges, so one can figure the differences rely in the 
scenarios and eliminated vaccination costs, which according to AUSSPREAD were 
calculated based on per animal costs and fixed per herd costs. 
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V.4 Saleyard Results 
Two saleyards were involved in this High Plains /AUSSPREAD model. The 
estimated number of buyers per sale was assumed to be 100. It was assumed that 90% of 
sales were in-region, with 10% being out of region. The probability of sending livestock 
to the sale was 20% and only herd types 7 and 8 (small and large beef) were assumed to 
sell livestock at sales. The probability of buying livestock from a sale was assumed to be 
20%. The saleyard was assumed to be infected if animals from an infected herd were 
sent to the sale. The saleyard was reset to uninfected status after each sale. All saleyards 
were assumed to be shut down 1 day post detection of FMD, in this case, day 15. In the 
model runs, a random herd was infected at the one saleyard resulting in late detection. 
The assumption was that the FMD would quickly spread before any response was 
initiated. However, the results from the saleyard runs did not come out as expected. The 
results over the trace period range fluctuated and remained flat without any distinct 
pattern. The total losses did differ from the large beef outbreak runs but did not come 
close to the impact that the feedlots reached.  
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Table 5.5. Saleyard FMD Outbreak Costs 
 
  Trace Periods 
Costs Trace dc 1 day Trace dc 2 days Trace dc 3 days Trace dc 4 days Trace dc 6 days Trace dc 8 days Trace dc 10 days 
Dead Livestock         
Minimum 180 35 35 49 189 69 58 
Maximum 141,820 163,881 157,038 147,059 150,156 211,535 150,995 
Average 22,499 18,924 19,065 18,975 22,536 20,912 21,180 
Euthanasia Costs         
Minimum $900 $175 $175 $245 $945 $345 $290 
Maximum $709,100 $819,405 $785,190 $735,295 $750,780 $1,057,675 $754,975 
Average $112,497 $94,620 $95,324 $94,874 $112,678 $104,559 $105,902 
Slaughter Costs         
Minimum $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 
Maximum $40,500 $38,300 $40,300 $38,900 $43,400 $37,800 $40,700 
Average $12,117 $12,460 $11,810 $12,235 $13,328 $12,820 $12,869 
Cleaning/Disinfection Costs 
Minimum $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 $25,000 
Maximum $707,000 $669,000 $708,000 $679,000 $737,000 $659,000 $708,000 
Average $209,888 $214,990 $204,214 $211,490 $230,724 $221,796 $222,551 
Surveillance Costs         
Minimum $750 $750 $750 $750 $750 $750 $750 
Maximum $22,500 $21,250 $22,700 $21,400 $23,050 $21,000 $22,450 
Average $6,578 $6,698 $6,384 $6,599 $7,227 $6,941 $6,961 
Disposal Costs         
Minimum $1,980 $385 $385 $539 $2,079 $759 $638 
Maximum $1,697,368 $1,959,785 $1,878,132 $1,759,786 $1,793,957 $2,533,545 $1,806,460 
Average $267,898 $224,985 $226,754 $225,563 $268,164 $248,744 $251,929 
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Table 5.5. Continued 
  Trace Periods 
Costs Trace dc 1 day Trace dc 2 days Trace dc 3 days Trace dc 4 days Trace dc 6 days Trace dc 8 days Trace dc 10 days 
Forgone Income               
Minimum $3,564  $624  $624  $901  $3,742  $1,297  $1,079  
Maximum $3,866,852  $3,133,067  $3,109,270  $4,066,666  $7,849,713  $5,652,679  $2,989,701  
Average $510,434  $358,668  $423,744  $514,281  $598,888  $518,794  $465,540  
Indemnity Payments       
Minimum $122,932  $19,228  $19,228  $27,995  $128,568  $40,521  $33,632  
Maximum $106,902,694  $117,284,556  $117,390,326  $110,038,132  $111,078,007  $161,543,973  $113,234,570  
Average $16,511,093  $12,372,178  $13,903,971  $14,080,229  $16,634,389  $15,350,404  $15,814,202  
Total        
Total Minimum $156,626  $47,662  $47,662  $56,931  $162,584  $70,172  $62,889  
Total Maximum $113,946,015  $123,925,363  $123,933,917  $117,339,179  $122,275,907  $171,505,672  $119,556,856  
Total Average $17,630,505  $13,284,600  $14,872,202  $15,145,272  $17,865,398  $16,464,059  $16,879,955  
*Cattle numbers and dollar amounts are estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009).
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The complete results are calculated and presented in Table 5.5 and Figures 5.19-
5.23. The total average economic losses ranged from $13,284,600 to $17,865,398 in US 
currency. The maximum potential losses ranged from $113,946,015 (trace dc 1 day) to 
$171,505,672 (trace dc 8 days). There was not one cost figure, (minimum, maximum, or 
average) that increased from the smallest trace period to the largest. The largest number 
of infected livestock was in the trace dc 8 days outbreak with its maximum dead totaling 
211,535 livestock. The largest average infected came from the trace dc 6 days outbreak 
with 22,536 infected/dead livestock, but it is noteworthy that the second closest was the 
smallest trace period, trace dc 1 day with 22,499. Also, the trace dc 1 day simulated runs 
produced the smallest maximum infected livestock as well, by a large margin. As 
expected, the indemnity payments made up approximately 90% of the costs that were 
applied to this study. Forgone income and disposal costs averaged over one million 
dollars over the trace period range, and were the other most influential cost figures, as 
they were in the company owned feedlot outbreaks. The highest numbers came from 
outbreaks that spread to feedlot(s) or dairies(s), as they created the most forgone income 
and indemnity payments. The longer it would take to find these subsequent infected 
herds, the more likely it would spread to these types of herds. This was illustrated in the 
trace dc 6 and 8 days outbreaks, where many of the simulated outbreaks involved large 
feedlots and large dairies, and caused their averages and maximums to be higher than the 
other outbreaks. 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.19. Dead Livestock from Saleyard FMD Outbreaks 
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Figure 5.20. Average Economic Costs from Saleyard FMD Outbreaks: Part A 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.21. Average Economic Costs from Saleyard FMD Outbreaks: Part B 
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Figure 5.22. Maximum Economic Costs from Saleyard FMD Outbreaks: Part A 
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*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
 
Figure 5.23. Maximum Economic Costs from Saleyard FMD Outbreaks: Part B 
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There could be many reasons why the AUSSPREAD model for the Texas High 
Plains did not perform as expected with the saleyard FMD outbreaks. The costs were 
expected to exponentially rise as the trace periods got longer. The losses may not have 
reached their potential in this study because the probability of buying and selling at the 
saleyard was low. If the chances were 20% that the owner would sell and 20% that 
someone might buy, that translates to a 4% chance the selling and buying will actually 
occur. If this assumption is true, then the saleyard expectations may be very low. Also, if 
true, then the sellers will be identified and their cattle tested. It is doubtful that many 
buyers who actually received cattle will be part of the traceback. Also, the saleyard is 
reset in this model and cannot be a source of continuous disease spread. The saleyard has 
sales every Monday (weather permitting), so with late detection (14 days), there should 
be at least two sales before the operation is shut down and reset. This could help a 
disease spread, but it also may have no impact if there were not any infected animals at 
the second sale or if they were a small number of actual sales.  If the percentage of 
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sales was much higher, greater losses from the saleyard outbreaks would be expected. 
The disease outbreaks may not have cost much more as the days went on because the 
buyers that purchased cattle were less likely to transport the cattle after receiving them. 
Thus no additional spread would have occurred. If the trace-back process took longer to 
track the subsequent infected herds, and allowed time for those producers to move any 
infected animals another time, then the expected results would be seen. 
 It seems true that the model did not produce substantial and effective results to 
present how minimizing animal tracing could minimize economic losses of a FMD 
outbreak in these saleyard situations. Yet, probability distribution function 
approximations were performed as with the large beef and company owned feedlot 
outbreaks to see if traceability had any effect on decreasing the instances of worst case 
scenarios.  Just as was done the company-owned feedlot FMD outbreaks, the PDFs for 
the saleyard outbreaks, shown in Figure 5.24, were done for all the trace periods (trace 
dc 1 day to trace dc 10 days). The PDFs showed promising results this time as well with 
  
  
81
 
0.00 20000000.00 40000000.00 60000000.00 80000000.00 100000000.00 120000000.00 140000000.00 160000000.00
FMD Outbreak Costs (in US Dollars)
f
(
l
o
s
s
e
s
)
trace dc 1 day trace dc 2 days trace dc 3 days trace dc 4 days trace dc 6 days trace dc 8 days trace dc 10 days
 
*Numbers estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
Figure 5.24. Probability Distribution Function Approximations of Saleyard FMD Outbreaks 
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traceability reducing extreme outcomes. Throughout the trace periods of subsequent 
tracing of herds, the PDF approximations presented that the more likely total costs 
appear in the range of the calculated averages and the worst cases are least likely to 
occur. As Table 5.5 shows, the trace dc 8 days outbreak has the largest maximum cost 
which is again represented in the PDF figure as the trace period with the longest PDF 
tail. The PDF for the trace dc 2 days outbreak shows that 50% (marked by the first line 
under the PDF) of the estimations were observed with lower total costs than the other 
outbreaks. Although hard to tell in the figure, the PDF tails are the shortest for the trace 
dc 1 day outbreak followed by the trace dc 2 day outbreak. Although it seems odd that 
the trace dc 10 day outbreak has a similar PDF tail to the other outbreaks, it is important 
to note that a significant portion of the total cost observations were larger than the other 
outbreaks. Since a larger trace period had the longest PDF tail (trace dc 8 days) and 
shorter trace periods had the shortest PDF tails and more estimations in lower costs 
(trace dc 1 day and trace dc 2 days), it can be safe to say that traceability does have an 
effect on minimizing extreme outcomes or maximum incurred losses from an FMD 
outbreak.  
Although the trace periods effectiveness varied in the saleyard outbreaks, other 
variables that could affect the disease spread, changes to the trace sensitivity and trace 
specificity, were performed. This analysis will be discussed in the following section. 
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V.5 Trace Sensitivity/Specificity Analysis 
The AUSSPREAD model allowed different ways other than changing the 
parameters to find the subsequent infected herds, e.g., days_til_dc. The probability 
variables were tracing sensitivity and trace specificity, which were determined the 
accuracy of subsequent herd locations, and how accurate it would indentify an infected 
herd and not a false positive (potential infected area but not infected herd). To test these 
percentage figures, we performed a large parallel shift in the values to see any changes 
in the total losses, as a method to evaluate their impact for animal traceability. It was 
assumed that by changing the values for trace sensitivity and specificity from .85 and .95 
to .45 and .55 respectively, we would see an increase across the board in losses due to 
the lack of accuracy in finding the subsequent herds. We again used the trace dc 2 days 
and 10 days outbreaks as we did for the welfare slaughter study, but we looked at those 
simulated runs from the saleyard and not the company owned feedlot herd type. The 
trace dc 2 days outbreak averaged the smallest economic losses out of all the calculated 
outbreaks for the saleyard runs. The trace dc 10 days was the longest trace period, and 
again, one of the more costly outbreaks, as one would expect. When the results were 
returned and tabulated, the losses were not large. For both outbreaks, the costs did not 
always increase, nor did the costs reflect the sensitivity/specificity changes. As can be 
seen in Table 5.6, there were increases from the trace dc 2 days outbreaks, but the trace 
dc 10 days outbreaks showed very flat results. For the trace dc 2 days outbreaks, the  
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Table 5.6. Tracing Sensitivity and Specificity Cost Analysis 
Original  Sensitivity/Specificity Change 
Saleyard Costs Trace dc 2 days Trace dc 10 days  Trace dc 2 days Trace dc 10 days 
Dead Livestock        
Minimum 35 58  183 141 
Maximum 163,881 150,995  179,556 147,962 
Average 18,924 21,180  20,206 20,417 
Euthanasia Costs        
Minimum $175 $290  $915 $705 
Maximum $819,405 $754,975  $897,780 $739,810 
Average $94,620 $105,902  $101,030 $102,085 
Slaughter Costs        
Minimum $1,500 $1,500  $1,500 $1,500 
Maximum $38,300 $40,700  $41,700 $37,100 
Average $12,460 $12,869  $12,414 $13,361 
Cleaning/Disinfection Costs       
Minimum $25,000 $25,000  $25,000 $25,000 
Maximum $669,000 $708,000  $725,000 $637,000 
Average $214,990 $222,551  $214,776 $230,755 
Surveillance Costs        
Minimum $750 $750  $750 $750 
Maximum $21,250 $22,450  $22,650 $19,900 
Average $6,698 $6,961  $6,724 $7,218 
Disposal Costs        
Minimum $385 $638  $2,013 $1,551 
Maximum $1,959,785 $1,806,460  $2,144,723 $1,771,914 
Average $224,985 $251,929  $240,358 $242,807 
Total        
Minimum $27,845 $28,236  $30,361 $29,647 
Maximum $3,671,621 $3,483,580  $4,011,409 $3,353,686 
Average $572,678 $621,393  $595,508 $616,644 
*Cattle numbers and dollar amounts are estimated from the High Pains version of AUSSPREAD 
simulation model (Ward et al., 2009) 
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average dead livestock went from 18,924 to 20,206 and the maximum dead went from 
163,881 to 179,556. This analysis did not include forgone income or indemnity 
payments since the initial costs resulted without the drastic changes that were expected. 
The total average losses, which included slaughter, disposal, disinfection, euthanasia, 
and surveillance, went from $572,678 to $734,837 for the trace dc 2 days outbreaks. The 
maximum losses for those outbreaks went from $3,671,621 to $4,011,409, a percentage 
increase of 9%. The total infected livestock and total economic losses stayed the same 
proximity and on average decreased for the trace dc 10 outbreaks with the 
sensitivity/specificity changes. The losses were expected to be vastly different since the 
ability to find the subsequent infected herds was negatively affected. The hypothesis was 
that the losses would have at least doubled since the ability to accurately find the 
infected herds was reduced by about 50%. The reasons this did not occur might have 
been due to a lack of understanding of how the tracing sensitivity/specificity worked in 
the model. Instead of using a parallel shift, more useful results might have come from 
decreasing the sensitivity but increasing the specificity percentage. This would make 
sense because if accurately finding infected herds would go down, then finding false 
positives (potential infected areas but animals not infected) would increase. Another 
reason is that the probability changes were used in conjunction with the saleyard runs 
that did not work well across the trace periods in the first place. Lastly, the model may 
not be able to perform the tracing sensitivity/specificity levels when performed outside 
the original days_til_dc parameters, 1 to 3 days. One thing that is noteworthy from this 
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modest analysis: the model is not as sensitive to animal traceability as expected, 
especially when changing the tracing sensitivity and specificity variables. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
VI.1 Summary and Discussion 
Large impact changes from the earliest trace period (trace dc 1 day) to the latest 
trace period (trace dc 10 days) were not consistently seen in the different simulated FMD 
outbreaks as performed by the High Plains modified AUSSPREAD model. Although the 
economic losses increased for the outbreaks initiated at the large beef operation, the 
increased impact was modest and trace periods 4, 6, 8 and 10 days were not examined. 
As mentioned, decreased traceability did not show expected productive results, with 
losses fluctuating for many of the trace periods for both the feedlot and saleyard 
outbreaks. Clearly, there was some benefit from the animal trace-back as losses from the 
first three trace periods (trace dc 1, 2 ,and 3 days) were less than the last trace periods 
(trace dc 6, 8, and 10 days) for average total dead livestock, average economic costs, and 
the average of maximum economic costs. For the feedlots, the average and average 
maximum economic losses of the first three trace periods were $83,429,277 and $203, 
551, 042 respectively. The average dead livestock totaled 102,260 animals and the 
average maximum dead were approximately 227,508 animals. The number of dead 
livestock for the last three trace periods only increased to 105,455 for the average 
infected, but jumped more than 70,000 to a total 300,348 animals dead for the average 
maximum infected. The average total costs also did not increase much over the last three 
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trace periods ($84,952,263), but, again, the average maximum costs increased nearly 
26% to $256,417,409. 
The different lengths of the subsequent tracing periods gave very peculiar results 
in the saleyard outbreaks. For the first three trace periods, the total average and average 
maximum economic losses were $15,262,436 and $120,601,765, respectively. Although 
minimal, these average costs increased nearly 12% for the average and average 
maximum to $17,069,804 and $137,779,478, respectively. For the first three trace period 
outbreaks, the number of infected livestock that were culled due to the current U.S. 
policy was 20,163 and 154,246 animals for the average and average maximum infected. 
The average number of dead livestock increased 6% to 21,543 animals and the 
maximum culled increase nearly 11% to 170,895 animals. It is clear that the number of 
culled animals in an outbreak will directly impact the total effect of the outbreak. This 
study has shown that decreased animal traceability can impact the number of infected 
animals and well-illustrates how devastating an outbreak can become. 
Regardless of how insensitive the AUSSPREAD model was for animal tracing, 
the simulated results clearly demonstrated how costly outbreaks of FMD can be, 
regardless of the location of the index case. There are many possible justifications for 
why the model was not as sensitive as expected. The outbreaks that began at the feedlot 
did not reach losses greater than the range of losses described in the original High Plains 
Report. Although this is due to the exclusion of vaccination practices, it does seem odd 
that the largest days_til_dc accommodated in the original model was three days. 
However in this study, the largest interval for subsequent tracing was 10 days, and the 
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outbreak losses still did not exceed the original range of costs. The effect of vaccination 
could not be determined, and negatively affected the comparison of the two studies. The 
model also seemed insensitive for animal traceability in the Texas High Plains. Thus, we 
were unable to determine the ability of tracing sensitivity and tracing specificity to 
impact the effects of an outbreak in a substantial way.  
The small number of simulations used (50 and 100) may also have played a part 
in not achieving more practical results from AUSSPREAD. These simulation iterations 
were chosen because the average time taken to receive results from a one hundred 
iteration simulated outbreak ranged from 8 to 15 hours. The unexpected results could 
also been in connection with the herds chosen for the outbreaks. One of the other 11 herd 
types may have been impacted more by the animal tracing changes. The fluctuating 
results from the saleyard runs may have directly been affected by the parameters of 
buying and selling of the livestock. Traffic and the probability to buy and sell seemed 
pessimistic and may have influenced the outbreaks in a suppressive way. Many of the 
other scenarios could have made an impact on how well animal traceability worked. For 
example, late detection might have masked the initial disease spread, as well as the large 
percentage increases in costs and overall losses.  
Other studies have suggested that the number of infected animals is one of the 
key factors to controlling an outbreak. It is difficult to compare the losses of this study to 
others since the applied costs/losses did not include trade losses, labor, or 
quarantine/welfare slaughter for all of the simulated outbreaks. The difference in losses 
and costs between the trace dc 2 days and trace 10 days outbreaks for the feedlot shows 
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how effective traceability can be. The 8 days difference in subsequent animal tracing 
cost about $93 million dollars when comparing maximum possible costs between the 
two. The 8 days difference also resulted in an increase of more than 155,000 dead 
livestock when comparing the maximum culled livestock between the two outbreaks.  
One of the key objectives of this study was to see if animal tracing could have an 
impact on the losses of a FMD outbreak. The goal was to present the changes in losses 
and to determine if the animal tracing could be economically effective. When comparing 
the benefits of animal tracing from our small subsequent tracing history (1 to 10 days) 
and the costs of the NAIS, animal tracing and identification can be supported and 
criticized under its current cost estimations. The USDA released a benefit cost analysis 
which estimated an effective NAIS would cost from 175.87 million (90% participation 
level) to 209.07 million annually (for 100% participation level) for the cattle sector, beef 
and dairy production (USDA, 2009a). Although these costs are significant, these 
implementation and maintenance “costs are less than one-half of a percent of the retail 
value of U.S. beef products” (USDA, 2009a). The USDA defines retrieval of traceback 
data within a 48 hour window as optimal for efficient, effective disease containment 
(USDA, 2008). As stated before, the difference in 2 days subsequent tracing and the 
largest tracing period examined in this study, 10 days, could amount to 93 million 
dollars lost in maximum potential costs. When considering welfare slaughter losses, the 
worst case scenarios show a total of 121,416,925 dollar difference. It is unlikely that if 
an outbreak occurs that these maximum costs would be realized, and although 
AUSSPREAD is intended to be a realistic model, “one is not dealing with reality; by 
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definition, models just simplify the world” (Garner and Beckett, 2005). So even though 
some outbreak’s (saleyard and large beef) average and maximum costs did not reach the 
levels of annual costs for the NAIS, the maximum losses from the feedlot show some 
benefits to implementing the system. The trace dc 10 day outbreak for the feedlot made 
some contributions and provided that an outbreak could cost near $585.98 million with 
the current study’s costs ,and the 100% annual implementation costs for NAIS for all 
species would cost an estimated $228.27 million, a difference of approximately $357 
million. Although this shows a significant benefit, it is unlikely that an outbreak would 
occur annually and the maximum losses would be attained, yet it does demonstrate a 
situation where it would be beneficial to have the NAIS.  It is noteworthy to mention that 
this analysis includes direct costs of the outbreaks (euthanasia, slaughter, cleaning and 
disinfection, surveillance, disposal) and a few indirect costs (forgone income, indemnity 
payments and welfare slaughter losses), but does not include all possible indirect costs, 
induced costs (labor, loss of production, tourism, price changes, etc), and also losses 
from the restriction of export markets.  
If all possible losses were realized and estimated, it is most likely that there 
would be a net benefit to have a NAIS. The trade losses from the value of beef exports ( 
US $2.2 billion) alone may validate the NAIS for the beef and dairy industry.  Yet, the 
possibility of an animal disease outbreak such as FMD annually in the U.S. is doubtful, 
so it will be unrealistic to see the benefits of NAIS with the USDA’s current cost 
estimations to the average producer. This study presents how costly the direct costs and 
indirect costs of an FMD outbreak can be within the United States and how traceability 
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can aid in minimizing those associated costs. The USDA’s NAIS system will be costly 
to the average cattle producer ($5.97/per head), but can help producers in protecting their 
cattle from destruction in the event of an any animal disease outbreak, can aid in global 
competitiveness of their products, and reduce producer’s from previous disease testing 
costs. One of the most significant aspects of NAIS is its ability to not only help respond 
to FMD outbreaks, but can help in all other animal diseases that could surface whether it 
be in cattle, swine, poultry, or etc. The costs of NAIS are high, but with more 
government aid, private industry involvement, and participation from U.S. producers, 
real costs when the NAIS is fully functional ought to be less than the cost analysis given 
by the USDA (USDA, 2009a). 
VI.2 Conclusion 
There are some drawbacks to using the High Plains /AUSSPREAD model as 
configured by Ward and Norby. The results showed that the variables, days till 
dangerous contacts are found (days_til_dc), and tracing sensitivity/specificity, may not 
be sensitive enough to show consistent and practical results when considering the 
relationship between outbreak length and total costs of an outbreak. However, 
AUSSPREAD’s variables and abilities should not be invalidated; rather the assumptions 
may have to be re-thought. Another factor that could have influenced the current study’s 
results was the AUSSPREAD variable, effectiveness of trace-back. The probability 
variable was set to 90%, which enabled the model to find all the trace-back animals at a 
90% success rate regardless of how many days taken to find the subsequent infected 
animals. As shown in previous research by Pendell et al. (2006-2008), the success rate of 
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finding subsequent infected animals directly affected the total costs of a FMD outbreak. 
If future traceability studies were examined with AUSSPREAD, the trace-back 
effectiveness rate should be considered when altering the parameters.  
The feedlot traceability study did show that added traceability could account for 
near a hundred million dollars in direct costs from an outbreak and prevention of 
eradication for over a hundred and fifty-five thousand animals. The results did prove that 
decreasing animal tracing levels can negatively impact the costs of a FMD outbreak. 
Throughout this study, maximum costs and losses increased with the increase of 
subsequent tracing periods, yet the average costs either stayed in a similar range or 
increased marginally. This study presents the possibility of animal traceability reducing 
the risk of extreme disease outcomes. This risk reduction can be beneficial in the support 
of animal tracing and identification.  If the worst case scenarios can be minimized, it will 
be more likely for the industry to rapidly recover from an animal disease outbreak. 
 It is important to realize that animal tracing can help in the process of 
responding and controlling an animal disease outbreak, and that such a system should be 
implemented. It is also imperative to realize that such a system is necessary to keep up 
with the global industry and to help in preserving animal disease security. Although 
rational, a tracing system capable of producing results shown in this study would be 
expensive. If and when the NAIS is fully implemented, the annual costs need to be as 
inexpensive to the producers as possible with added incentives, and also have the 
government consider it a public benefit and undertake a significant portion of the 
implementation and annual maintenance costs. In conclusion, longer tracing periods, 
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larger simulations (by iteration), and further study of the model is necessary in order to 
more accurately imitate FMD outbreaks within the Texas High Plains and its detrimental 
effects. 
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